concluding that in addition to the fact that neither the 2 plain language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 nor the committee note mandated additional due 3 process protections when imposing a punitive monetary fine under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 11, the fear of spawning “satellite litigation” by requiring a second trial whenever 5 punitive monetary fines may be imposed was enough to cause the vitality of Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 11 to be “drained away”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that in addition to the fact that neither the 2 plain language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 nor the committee note mandated additional due 3 process protections when imposing a punitive monetary fine under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 11, the fear of spawning “satellite litigation” by requiring a second trial whenever 5 punitive monetary fines may be imposed was enough to cause the vitality of Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 11 to be “drained away”
- finding that due process requires notice and an opportunity to respond prior to imposition of Rule 11 sanctions but that a hearing is not necessary and may be a “waste of judicial resources” where the attorney fails to present support for her claims despite opportunities to do so
- explaining that it is advisable to avoid a sanction that penalizes the parties for the offenses of their counsel
- finding Rule 11 sanctions based on the factual adequacy of a complaint are best considered after the parties have moved for summary judgment and have been given notice and opportunity to identify any genuine issues of material fact
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HILL, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur in the judgment reversing the judgment of the district court, but not for the reasons given.
*1562 This case is almost a carbon copy of Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir.1984), rev’d. in part, 776 F.2d 942 (en banc), modified on rehearing, 783 F.2d 1000 (11th Cir.1986). In both cases, a party to a domestic relations dispute asserted that state court officials and others conspired to produce a judgment in state court adverse to the interests of the federal claimant. 1 Both cases presented bare-bones allegations of conspiracy and other wrongdoing. In both cases all defendants unconditionally denied participating in any conspiracy or wrongdoing.
The plaintiff’s case in Dykes was dismissed after the parties had engaged in extensive discovery. In fact they produced some 10,000 pages of disposition testimony, which the district court carefully evaluated before granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. None of it contained any direct evidence of conspiracy. Yet, we reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding, apparently, that conspiracy could be inferred from the lawful actions of state officials. 2 I dissented from the two panel opinions in Dykes because I agreed with the district judge that the plaintiff’s allegations were totally without support in the record. Id., 743 F.2d at 1500 (Hill, C.J., dissenting); 783 F.2d at 1000 (Hill, C.J., dissenting).
At this point, Jurldine Donaldson’s proofs of conspiracy are no weaker than those offered by the plaintiff in Dykes. Both asserted that conspiracy may be inferred solely from the fact that state officials carried out a series of lawful acts. Indeed, if there is a distinction between the two cases, it is that Ms. Donaldson’s case for conspiracy may prove stronger than Ms. Dykes’, were she allowed to proceed with discovery. Yet here Ms. Donaldson’s attorney is potentially subject to Rule 11 sanctions, for simply filing a case that the opinion in Dykes authorized.
The result in Dykes and the result here are so dramatically different they can not sit together comfortably in the same circuit. I would prefer that we take this opportunity, en banc, to correct Dykes. However, while that case is good law in this circuit we ought not subject an attorney who follows it to the extreme sanctions of Rule 11. What we held to be the proper work of a lawyer in Dykes may be found to be near contempt in this case, and yet the difference between the two cases escapes me.
I do not take issue with the extensive discussion of Rule 11 which forms part III of this opinion. It is a valuable guide for lawyers, judges and others who need confront Rule 11 in the future. I would simply reverse the district court’s award of sanctions in this case, and not leave it open on remand. Given our opinion in Dykes, Rule 11 has no role to play in this case.
. Dykes involved a child custody case, and this case stems from the Donaldsons' divorce proceeding, but there the distinction ends. As I stated in my dissent from the original panel opinion in Dykes, “If there are any cases where conclusory allegations of conspiracy and wrongdoing are likely to be made against a judge and other persons involved in the dispute, they are cases such as this, where the strongest emotions of both parties are unleashed.” Dykes, 743 F.2d at 1501-1502 .
. The en banc court did hold that the judge who was sued in Dykes was absolutely immune. However, the panel, upon rehearing, allowed the case to proceed against the other appellees, save one. Id. 783 F.2d at 1000 . -