The opinion
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the federal claim was not insubstantial, but ultimately unredressable because of the absence of state action. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s strained conclusion that the district court abused its discretion in exercising pendent jurisdiction.
The state and federal claims sought to remedy the same injury, and the district court decided them virtually simultaneously. Factors of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants thus all militate in favor of the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in this case. The result of the majority’s decision is to force the plaintiff to refile and relitigate her action in state court.
As the Supreme Court has said, “it is evident from Gibbs that pendent state law claims are not always, or even almost always, to be dismissed and not adjudicated. On the contrary, given advantages of economy and convenience and no unfairness to litigants, Gibbs contemplates adjudication of these claims.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 , 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1383 , 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (interpreting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 , 86 S.Ct. 1130 , 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)). This case, like Gibbs, has “one plaintiff, one defendant, and a federal claim joined with a state created claim.” C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 107 (4th ed. 1983). It is, like Gibbs , “a classic illustration of pendent jurisdiction.” Id. I would therefore review the district court’s decision on the merits of the state law claim.