Opinion

Solomon Monk, A/K/A David L. Martin v. Secretary of the Navy

  • 793 F.2d 364
  • 253 U.S. App. D.C. 293
  • 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 26127
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jun 20, 1986
Status
Published
Author
Mikva
On the bench
Mikva, Bork, Greene
Cited by
62 cases

holding that it is not habeas if the plaintiffs seek an injunction enjoining prospective enforcement of prison regulations which does not challenge the underlying validity of their confinement

How later courts described this case

  • holding that it is not habeas if the plaintiffs seek an injunction enjoining prospective enforcement of prison regulations which does not challenge the underlying validity of their confinement
  • explaining that a petitioner “may not avoid the requirement that he proceed by habeas corpus by adding a request for relief that may not be made in a petition for habeas corpus”
  • holding that the proper respondent in a habeas action brought by a military prisoner is the commandant of the military detention facility, not the Secretary of the Navy
  • holding an action for a declaratory judgment that a conviction is unlawful “must be construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

MIKVA, Circuit Judge,

concurring:

As the court’s opinion ably demonstrates, the law in this circuit plainly requires that habeas corpus actions be filed where the petitioner’s immediate custodian resides. I therefore concur in the opinion and the decision to dismiss Monk’s complaint because the court lacks jurisdiction.

I write separately, however, to articulate my grave concern that justice has not yet been done in this case. A careful review of the record leaves me firmly convinced that there are critical questions about Monk’s guilt that have never been adequately addressed. Even giving complete deference on credibility questions to the factfinders in the military court, there remain significant inconsistencies in the evidence and in the evidentiary procedures adopted at trial that cannot easily be brushed aside. Findings concerning appellee’s whereabouts at the time of his wife’s death, and the unavailability to Monk of potentially exculpatory information and evidence require, I think, the proper authority to re-examine the finding of guilt.

Absent the necessary jurisdiction, these questions are not properly before us; hence I do not rehearse the arguments presented. I concur separately only to emphasize my feeling that Monk’s complaint raises important issues, ones that deserve careful examination should this case be reviewed elsewhere.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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