upholding exclusion of prospective juror where “the trial judge did articulate an unquestionably correct legal standard [under Witt ] on many ... occasions during the voir dire”
How later courts described this case
- upholding exclusion of prospective juror where “the trial judge did articulate an unquestionably correct legal standard [under Witt ] on many ... occasions during the voir dire”
- “A conscientious trial judge must be bent upon determining if a prospective juror has such a mind set that he or she would refuse to vote for the death penalty regardless of the evidence in the case. That is fact-finding.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLARK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I concur with Judge Johnson’s dissent. I find compelling the following statement by Judge Hill in his special concurrence to our en bane court’s reversal of the district court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus. 725 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.1984) (en banc):
A conscientious trial judge must be bent upon determining if a prospective juror has such a mind set that he or she would refuse to vote for the death penalty regardless of the evidence in the case. That is fact-finding. “The state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.” Eddington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. 459, 483 (1885) (Bowen, L.J.).
Yet the record must contain sufficient evidence to justify a finding of fact that a venireperson was of such a mind set that he or she was, under the law, disqualified, or the finding cannot be said to be supported. In Mr. Murphy’s case, there was not sufficient evidence. He was clearly shown to be a person who could not vote in favor of capital punishment without violating his principles. He was not asked (so he never said) whether or not, if the evidence were sufficiently strong and the circumstances sufficiently aggravating, he could nevertheless vote to recommend the death penalty.
Judge Fay recounts for us the painstaking and conscientious efforts of Judge Dewell to adhere to the teachings of Witherspoon in the voir dire proceedings. It seems clear that Mr. Murphy heard and, no doubt, understood what had been asked of those who had been examined before him. One must assume that he fully expected to be asked, after he had acknowledged his principled opposition to the death penalty, whether or not he could nevertheless vote in favor of it if the evidence in the case indicated it to be appropriate under the law. For aught appearing, he may have felt compelled under his oath to say that he could. Until it appeared that he could not, he was not disqualified. Applying the teachings of Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976), the writ must issue, conditioned upon resentencing.
725 F.2d at 1551 (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court made crystal clear in Wainwright v. Witt, 496 U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) that it reaffirmed the standard it had set in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 , 100 S.Ct. 2521 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980) when it said:
That standard is whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”
105 S.Ct. at 852 (quoting from Adams) (footnote omitted).
It is clear that juror Murphy was never given an opportunity to state whether his views would prevent or impair the performance of his duties.
I also dissent on the issues of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel as I did initially as a member of the three judge panel, 699 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir.1983) at pages 1040-43.