stating that “[¡judicial immunity does not extend to acts committed with a clear absence of all jurisdiction,” but “where the alleged harm, though resulting from a bribe or conspiracy, was inflicted by acts to which absolute immunity would apply, the complaint is insufficient to avoid judicial immunity”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[¡judicial immunity does not extend to acts committed with a clear absence of all jurisdiction,” but “where the alleged harm, though resulting from a bribe or conspiracy, was inflicted by acts to which absolute immunity would apply, the complaint is insufficient to avoid judicial immunity”
- concluding that where state officials' acts were not "committed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction," case did not fall into ultra vires exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and dismissing all pendent state law claims including those for equitable, declaratory and legal relief
- concluding that a judge who allegedly seized control of an oil company pursuant to a bribe was entitled to judicial immunity
- referencing Pennhurst’s “ ‘ultra vires’ exception to eleventh amendment immunity, and concluding that a state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts ‘without any authority whatever’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Under the current procedural posture of the instant case, the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged acts committed after the Texas Court of Appeals’ mandamus order which were in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 , 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105 , 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s interlocutory decision that plaintiffs’ cause of action against Judge Walker should not be dismissed on immunity grounds.