finding that detention of forty-two hours violated arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights, where officers learned early in the detention that arrestee would not be charged and the only reason for delay was that police were trying to build a ease against arrestee, and reversing jury verdict in favor of defendants and directing verdict in arrestee’s favor
How later courts described this case
- finding that detention of forty-two hours violated arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights, where officers learned early in the detention that arrestee would not be charged and the only reason for delay was that police were trying to build a ease against arrestee, and reversing jury verdict in favor of defendants and directing verdict in arrestee’s favor
- observing “that civil rights actions often pit unsympathetic plaintiffs—criminals, or members of the criminal class ... —against the guardians of the community’s safety, yet serve an essential deterrent function”
- finding probable cause a jury question when difference of opinion exists
- noting that sealing off the house would have been difficult in part because it was nighttime
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991)
763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44
The opinion
CUMMINGS, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Having closely reviewed the facts of this case, I am compelled to agree with Judge Wood that plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict on the issue of probable cause should have been granted and therefore join his vigorous dissent. I also believe that serious trial errors, particularly involving the jury instructions, occurred below, and that such errors alone do not permit a verdict for the police officers to stand in a Section 1983 case. Although in my view the probable cause issue never should have reached the jury, I cannot disagree with the position expressed in Judge Posner’s opinion that, assuming a valid jury question was presented on that issue, plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial, and therefore join in his discussion of trial errors and concur in his decision to remand for a new trial. I also concur in his disposition of Count VII.