holding that prison officials’ failure to inspect and maintain cell beds and exercise equipment which, in two separate incidents, fell and allegedly injured inmate, were merely assertions that the officials did not exercise due care, not evidence of deliberate indifference
How later courts described this case
- holding that prison officials’ failure to inspect and maintain cell beds and exercise equipment which, in two separate incidents, fell and allegedly injured inmate, were merely assertions that the officials did not exercise due care, not evidence of deliberate indifference
- holding that a five-month gap between an inmate’s protected activity and allegedly retaliatory conduct “greatly weakens any inference” that an act was taken in retaliation for the exercise of constitutional rights
- holding that six-day period between when plaintiff contacted attorney and alleged retaliatory conduct by defendants not sufficient from which to infer retaliatory motive
- holding that a Plaintiff must provide “sufficient factual matter to outline the elements of his cause of action or claim, proof of which is essential to his recovery.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Willie Henderson v. Krista Wilcoxen, 802 F.3d 930 (2015)
761 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Henderson v. Wilcoxen, 802 F.3d 930
Abrogated on other grounds by Tony Walker v. Tommy G. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (2002)
761 F.2d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 1985) (agreeing that “the allegation that defendants failed to inspect and maintain the beds and exercise equipment is merely an allegation that defendants did not exercise due care” and were negligent, and “does not evidence deliberate indifference.”), abrogated on other grounds by Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005
The opinion
SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Benson alleges a number of instances in which medical treatment for his head and neck injuries was either denied or delayed: (1) he did not see a physician until at least two days after each of his two accidents, which occurred in February and March of 1981, Amended Complaint at 1115(d); (2) he did not receive an X-ray diagnosis for his neck injury until more than a year after the accident, id.; (3) he did not receive all of the medicine prescribed for him between February and May 1981, id. at H 15(f), (h); (4) he did not receive a cervical collar prescribed for him on February 2, 1982, id. at 1115(j); (5) he did not receive all of the traction prescribed for his neck injury in March, August, and November 1981, id. at 1115(i); (6) his treatment was hindered by the requirement that he be handcuffed during medical examinations, id. at U 15(¿); (7) after sustaining his injuries, he remained in a cramped, double-cell, which aggravated his neck injury, id. at U 15(n); (8) instead of the pain reliever and muscle relaxant he needed, Benson was prescribed a psychiatric drug that caused him to suffer harmful side effects, id. at 1115(g); and (9) he was denied permission to visit an outside hospital for prescribed therapy, id. at 1115(k). I would hold that these allegations, read as a whole, state a claim of reckless disregard on the part of all defendants for Benson’s serious medical needs, thereby satisfying the “deliberate indifference” standard of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 , 97 S.Ct. 285 , 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). See Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 , 197 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 , 98 S.Ct. 1507 , 55 L.Ed.2d 530 (1978).
I am willing to accept the majority’s conclusion that, except for the ninth allegation enumerated above, each of the allegations individually state only a negligence or malpractice claim, which is not a sufficient breach of duty to violate the eighth amendment. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105-06 , 97 S.Ct. at 291-92 . And I am willing to accept its conclusion that the allegations read as a whole do not state an eighth amendment *345 claim of “deliberate indifference” in the sense that they do not show “such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access to adequate medical care.” Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir.1983) (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 , 101 S.Ct. 1759 , 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981)). Nevertheless, I must dissent because the majority ignores another alternative means for establishing deliberate indifference that was set forth in Wellman .
In Wellman this court held that deliberate indifference “can be evidenced by ‘repeated examples of negligent acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staff.’ ” Wellman, 715 F.2d at 272 (quoting Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575 ). The nine allegations enumerated above establish such a pattern. The only remaining issue, then, is whether all the defendants should be included in this “pattern of conduct.” Cady, Israel, Manthe, and Whit-more, as supervisory personnel with an obligation to ensure the physical well-being of inmates, should be held responsible for such a systemic breakdown in healthcare. Whether the six defendant physicians should also be held responsible is less clear. Yet, given Benson’s allegations that these individual doctors had a supervisory duty to ensure that their medical orders were carried out, Amended Complaint at THI7-12, and that all the defendants worked “in concert,” id. at II17, these doctors should be deemed responsible, at least at this stage of the proceedings.
Quite possibly, defendants will eventually establish that there was no pattern of negligence or that various defendants were not sufficiently high in the supervisory hierarchy to be deemed responsible for systemic deficiencies. But to reach that conclusion now, before any discovery has been taken, would be inappropriate. Indeed, by imposing such a heavy burden on the plaintiff at the pleading stage, the majority ignores the most fundamental policies of the Federal Rules. I would reverse the district court’s order dismissing seven defendants from the ease and would remand for further proceedings.