Robert Smith, Jr. v. Warden James Rose

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Although I agree that administrative segregation did not violate Smith’s due process rights, I dissent from the majority’s determination that Smith’s claim for deprivation of property fails, as a matter of law, because an adequate state remedy was available.

It deserves emphasis that proper analysis begins from the dual premises that we should liberally construe Smith’s complaint, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 , 92 S.Ct. 594 , 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), and that we must view all evidence supporting his factual allegations in the light most favorable to Smith on this review of a grant of summary judgment to the defendants. Smith not only alleges that prison officials negligently or intentionally deprived him of property, but also alleges that he filed a state law tort suit against the defendants for deprivation of property. The record reveals that Smith’s pro se suit in state court was dismissed several months before he filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Smith alleges that his state suit was dismissed for lack of prosecution because prison officials failed to transport him to Tennessee General Sessions Court on the hearing date. The majority’s resort to the Tennessee Code does not in this context establish that an adequate state remedy was available to Smith. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, a genuine question of material fact remains on this issue.

I believe that whether an adequate state remedy is available must be considered in the context of each case, as a question of fact. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S.Ct. 1908 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), and Hudson v. Palmer, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3194 , 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), stand for the proposition that an adequate state postdeprivation remedy will satisfy procedural due process- when a state prisoner alleges negligent or intentional deprivation of property by a person acting under color of state law but not in1 a manner authorized by established procedure. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), established that the federal remedy under § 1983 is supplemental to state remedies, which “need not be first sought and refused” Id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. at 482 . The Court arrived at this conclusion by reviewing the legislative history of the Act and determining that § 1983 has three distinctive purposes: first, to override certain objectionable state laws; second, to provide a remedy when state law is inadequate; and third, the broader purpose to provide a federal remedy where a state remedy, although adequate in theory, is not available in practice. Id. at 173-74, 81 S.Ct. at 476-77 . Parratt did not review the legislative history of § 1983 and reject or revise the Court’s declaration of the purposes of the Act as set forth in Monroe ; rather, Parratt operates within the tradition of Monroe and provides a gloss on Monroe’s statement that a § 1983 action may be brought when a state remedy is adequate in theory but not in practice. Parratt establishes, for its particular factual setting, the characteristics of a state remedy that is adequate in practice. Under Parratt , the *108 state remedy must be available in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time after the initial dispossession of the prisoner’s property. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540 , 101 S.Ct. at 1915 . If so, no constitutional deprivation has occurred and a federal forum is unnecessary. Id. at 543 , 101 S.Ct. at 1917 . Parratt has particularized the analysis of Monroe , rather than undermined Monroe’s holding that the § 1983 remedy is supplemental to state remedies.

The determination óf whether a state remedy is actually, not merely theoretically, available in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time necessarily requires consideration of the circumstances of each case. For example, if the value of the seized property diminishes over time, or if its seizure places the property in jeopardy of destruction, then state provision of a remedy within a “meaningful time” may require a greater dispatch than where the property has been destroyed at the time of the seizure and only money damages, rather than restitution, are available. This Court has noted, in another due process context, that “determining a reasonable time period defies easy exegesis.” Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 721 F.2d 550, 564 (6th Cir.1983).

Smith’s complaint alleges that he was denied what he believed was an adequate state tort remedy by the abusive behavior of state officials who prevented him from pursuing his claim. This is the sort of abuse § 1983 was intended to remedy; if Smith’s allegation is true, his state remedy was only theoretically available.

The majority ignores these allegations and simply looks to the Tennessee Code to determine whether an adequate remedy is available. The majority ultimately relies upon this Court’s opinion in Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.1983). In Vicory , the Court properly required the plaintiff to plead and prove that state remedies were “inadequate in theory or practice.” Id. at 1065 . This portion of the Vicory holding is entirely in keeping with Monroe and Parratt . The Court went on, however, to require demonstration of a “systematic problem with the state’s corrective process.” Id. While such a showing will satisfy Monroe and Parratt , a deprivation of due process is no less a constitutional violation for being aberrant rather than systematic.

It appears that the Court’s concern in Vicory was not remedying due process violations, but remedying the case load of federal courts overburdened with prisoners’ § 1983 claims. See Vicory, 721 F.2d at 1065 n. 4. The majority today holds that Smith had an adequate state remedy on the ground that in Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197 (6th Cir.1985), another panel of this Court examined the Tennessee Code and found that it provided “adequate procedures.” Id. at 199 . While this is a relevant threshold finding, it does not properly end the matter. Nor will the question be finally resolved in this Circuit once we have examined the statute books of Kentucky, Ohio and Michigan. Parratt and Monroe require not theoretical but actual state remedies for individual persons who have been deprived of property under color of state law. These authorities mandate examination of the circumstances of each case.

Not all prisoner § 1983 cases involve hobby kits. Smith alleges that the clothes that the defendants did not return to him would have provided exculpatory evidence in later proceedings on the rape and assault charges. This allegation is more than plausible; the Nashville Metropolitan Police examined the same belongings for inculpatory evidence.

When I examine all of the circumstances of Smith’s case and view the evidence in the light most favorable to him, I am not convinced that summary judgment on Smith’s claim of property deprivation was proper. I respectfully dissent because I believe reversal in part is appropriate.