“[E]ven a cursory review of the provision’s legislative history would reveal that the drafters of § 1292(b) felt the participation of the trial judge in procedurally screening interlocutory orders to be ‘essential’ in fulfilling the provision’s dual purpose of ensuring that only appropriate cases are subject to interlocutory review and avoiding wasteful and fruitless jurisdictional determinations in the courts of appeals.”
How later courts described this case
- “[E]ven a cursory review of the provision’s legislative history would reveal that the drafters of § 1292(b) felt the participation of the trial judge in procedurally screening interlocutory orders to be ‘essential’ in fulfilling the provision’s dual purpose of ensuring that only appropriate cases are subject to interlocutory review and avoiding wasteful and fruitless jurisdictional determinations in the courts of appeals.”
- “[E]ven a cursory review of the provision’s legislative history would reveal that the drafters of § 1292(b
- "[A]n order is final only when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
E. GRADY JOLLY,
Dissenting:
Because I believe the district court’s or-
der in this case constitutes an injunction under section 1292(a)(1), I respectfully dissent.
I am persuaded that the order in this case satisfied the requirements for appeala-bility under section 1292(a)(1): first, the order had the practical effect of an injunction; second, the order carried “serious, perhaps irreparable consequences,” and third, it could only be effectively challenged on appeal. Carson v. American Brands, 450 U.S. 79 , 101 S.Ct. 993 , 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). The order here forbids the FmHA, which is charged by Congress with administration and interpretation of the statute authorizing the mortgage in this case, from foreclosing unless the agency changes its national policy and compromises its interpretation of that statute. Moreover, as a practical matter, the agency could not withdraw the regulations once they have been promulgated and implemented on a nationwide basis. The majority concedes that compliance with the order will “require significant regulatory action by the Secretary that would have an impact clearly beyond that possibly relating to the Garners,” majority opinion, slip op. at 1542, at 286. Such a requirement to effect this single foreclosure goes far beyond imposing a condition solely on this case. The imposition of such a far reaching requirement must be viewed as an injunction.
Finally, I note that the majority’s opinion carries with it a serious potential for abuse in permitting district courts the power to direct substantial and seriously disputed nationwide changes in agency procedure without adequate appellate review. The potential for abuse is obscured in the present case by the exemplary conduct of the district court which expressly certified its order for appellate review. That the district court here showed such restraint should not blind us to the unfortunate possible consequences of the holding in this case. I therefore respectfully dissent.