The opinion
SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge.
I concur with the opinion of this court that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Benson’s first amendment claim. I dissent, however, from the court’s opinion on Benson's due process claim. I conclude that the latter claim involves material questions of fact that cannot be determined in a summary judgment proceeding, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), and would remand the claim to the district court.
The majority assumes, as do I, that state employees have a right to be represented by the state in civil actions brought against them arising out of their employment. Ante at 1184. Thus, Benson’s procedural due process claim involves the question of what process was due him before the defendants could reject his request for state-provided representation. See Larry v. Lawler, 605 F.2d 954 (7th Cir.1978). Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2739 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the defendants were required to provide only those procedural safeguards that were objectively reasonable in light of established law and policy. I agree with the majority that there is no law establishing the precise process to be afforded before denying an application for state-provided representation. I also agree that the process due in any given case depends on the circumstances of the case and the nature of the interests involved. See ante at 1185-1186. I disagree, however, that the absence of clearly established procedures renders “reasonable” any procedures afforded Benson by the defendants.
At least since Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), the law has been clearly established that once a protected property interest is established, the state cannot deprive a person of that interest without affording some procedural safeguards. Those safeguards include, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to be heard. “It is axiomatic that before the government can deprive a person of a protected interest in property, the due process guarantee of the Constitution requires ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1076 (7th Cir.1982) (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 , 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1562 , 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978)). In the absence of established law defining the precise procedures to be followed in a given instance, precision is not required of government officials. This is not to say, however, that officials are not therefore required to afford a claimant any procedures. They are still required to provide some minimal notice and hearing procedures.
I conclude that it cannot be determined on the present record whether the procedures afforded Benson met the minimal standards of due process and would remand the issue to the district court. The record shows only that Benson sent a letter to the Attorney General’s office requesting representation in the civil rights actions pending against him and that Benson was sent a letter from defendant Caplan denying the request. The record does not indicate what if any type of review was made of Benson’s application or what procedures if any were available to Benson to contest an unfavorable decision. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether the procedures used to determine that Benson was not entitled to representation were reasonably calculated to afford Benson notice and an opportunity to be heard.
In addition to a procedural due process claim, I find that Benson states a substantive due process claim that raises material questions of fact. Benson alleges that irre *1190 speetive of the procedures used by the defendants, the decision to deny him state-provided representation was arbitrary and contrary to established law and practice. This court has recognized that arbitrary state action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property may constitute a substantive due process violation. See United States ex rel. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433 , 445 n. 28 (7th Cir.1982); Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School District, 492 F.2d 1, 3-4 (7th Cir.1974). Under Harlow, supra, the question before this court is whether the defendants’ decision to deny Benson’s request for state-provided representation, on the basis of a letter from the Department of Revenue declaring that Benson was an independent contractor, was objectively reasonable.
The Indemnification Act requires the State to provide representation or indemnification to its employees in accordance with the terms of the statute. The definition of “employee” expressly excludes independent contractors. 1981 Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 127, § 1301. Whether a worker is classified as an employee or an independent contractor is a critical question in many employment-related claims. See, e.g., Alexander v. Industrial Commission, 72 Ill.2d 444, 448 , 21 Ill.Dec. 342, 343 , 381 N.E.2d 669, 670 (1978) (only employees entitled to award under Workmen’s Compensation Act); Byrne v. Stern, 103 Ill.App.3d 601, 604-05 , 59 Ill.Dec. 316, 318-19 , 431 N.E.2d 1073, 1075-76 (1981) (employer is liable under Liquor Control Act only for conduct of employees); Dumas v. Lloyd, 6 Ill.App.3d 1026, 1030 , 286 N.E.2d 566, 569 (1972) (employer is liable only for negligent acts of employees). The law in Illinois is clearly established that the characterization of the worker by the employer does not determine whether the worker is an employee or an independent contractor. See Bauer v. Industrial Commission, 51 Ill.2d 169 , 170—72, 282 N.E.2d 448, 449-51 (1972); Manahan v. Daily News-Tribune, 50 Ill.App.3d 9, 14 , 8 Ill.Dec. 659, 663 , 365 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (1977). Rather, the courts will examine a variety of factors, the most important of which is the worker’s right to control the manner of doing work. Other factors to be considered include whether the worker is compensated on a time basis or by the job, whether the employer maintains the right to discharge the worker, the nature of the worker’s occupation in terms of the degree of skill required and its relationship to the regular business of the employer, and whether the employer furnishes the worker with materials or equipment. See Alexander v. Industrial Commission, supra, 72 Ill.2d at 449 , 21 Ill.Dec. at 343 , 381 N.E.2d at 670 .
Benson alleges, among other things, that he performed his duties pursuant to the direction, control, and instructions of Department supervisors; his conduct was supervised on a day-to-day basis by his superiors; he performed the same duties as a Security and Fraud Investigator, which has been a Civil Service position since 1969; he was issued state equipment by his superiors, including an investigator’s badge, a radio, handcuffs, state license plates, FBI training materials, and an Employee’s Handbook; he was authorized by the Department to carry a service revolver while performing his official duties and received training by the Department in the use of firearms. In addition, Benson’s contract with the Department provided for compensation on a time basis and authorized the Department to discharge Benson at will. These allegations are sufficient to raise a factual question whether Benson was an employee or an independent contractor. This question cannot be resolved on the basis of a single sentence contained in the employment contract. Cf. Bauer v. Industrial Commission, supra, 51 Ill.2d at 170—72, 282 N.E.2d at 449-51 (examining the control and authority exercised by employer to determine worker’s status despite statement in contract that worker was an independent contractor).
More importantly for the issue on appeal in the instant case, Benson’s allegations raise a material question whether an attorney general, who is presumed to know the law of the state that he represents, could have reasonably decided that Benson was *1191 an independent contractor. The answer to this question depends, in part, on facts not in the record such as what information concerning the terms of Benson’s employment was available to the defendants. Thus, I find that summary judgment was improper on this claim as well. *
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from Part II.A. of the court’s opinion.
Having concluded that Benson’s due process claim survives summary judgment on the issue of defendants’ qualified immunity, I note my disagreement with the district court’s finding that Benson did not state a due process claim under section 1983 because alternative remedies provided him all the process that was due. See Benson v. Scott, No. 81-C-6591, Mem.Op. at 10-12 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 29, 1982). Post-deprivation remedies, such as those cited by the district court, satisfy the due process clause only if pre-deprivation process is impracticable. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 , 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1158 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982); Vail v. Board of Education, 706 F.2d 1435, 1440-41 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 66 , 78 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 , 1319 & n. 24 (7th Cir.1975), modified en banc, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 , 98 S.Ct. 1507 , 55 L.Ed.2d 529 (1978); Begg v. Moffitt, 555 F.Supp. 1344, 1353-65 (N.D.Ill.1983). There was no showing that pre-deprivation process was impracticable in the instant matter. Moreover, the remedies cited by the district court are too vague and speculative to supplant Benson's section 1983 remedy. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., supra, 455 U.S. at 436-37 , 102 S.Ct. at 1158-59 ; Evans v. City of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1298 (7th Cir.1982).