noting that a plaintiff who is "untutored in the niceties of the law" might feel threatened by a lawsuit in which no damages could be awarded "to the extent of being reluctant to speak quite as freely with the suit hanging over her head as she would have been without it"
How later courts described this case
- noting that a plaintiff who is "untutored in the niceties of the law" might feel threatened by a lawsuit in which no damages could be awarded "to the extent of being reluctant to speak quite as freely with the suit hanging over her head as she would have been without it"
- upholding district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of retaliatory- counterclaim claim because defendant lacked ‘evil motive’ when filing its suit
- alternate holding that school board's litigation actions, prompted by plaintiff's protected speech, were not actionable in absence of evidence of "evil motive"
- civil declaratory judgment action
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROSENN, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. I write separately, however, to emphasize the limited scope of our decision.
In the early 1970’s, the School Board of the City of Norfolk — pursuant to court order — began to bus many of its 54,000 students in an effort to desegregate the school district. By 1982, however, the widespread skepticism concerning the wisdom of busing had found its way to Norfolk. The School Board therefore sponsored a series of public fora designed to elicit the thoughts of citizens whose families would be affected by a plan to significantly curtail the use of busing. Carolyn Bell, a black woman with an eight year old son, availed herself of the Board’s invitation to share her apprehensions about the plan, and evidently did so in an intelligent, articulate, and effective manner. For her contribution to the community discussion, Mrs. Bell was rewarded with a letter informing her that she and her son — who had very little to say about the issue — had been named defendants in a lawsuit.
I can readily understand how Mrs. Bell, untutored in the niceties of the law, might have felt threatened by the lawsuit to the extent of being reluctant to speak quite as freely with the suit hanging over her head as she would have been without it. The School Board’s response — that it was in fact doing Mrs. Bell a favor by “providing her with a much stronger podium from which to express her opposition to the plan” — seems to me to reflect a striking insensitivity to the practical consequences of its actions. Hauling someone into court, even in a representative capacity, can hardly be said to be the most benevolent of actions.
Neither plaintiffs’ complaint nor their supporting documentation, however, alleges that the School Board instituted its suit. to quiet Mrs. Bell’s opposition to the plan. I consider the absence of such an allegation critical. Rather, plaintiffs merely allege that the institution of the declaratory judgment action “cause[d] a chilling effect.”
For the foregoing reason, as well as for all the reasons stated by the majority, I believe that the facts viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs do not amount to a violation of first amendment rights.