noting that “the use of quotas or goals under Title VII without regard to specific victims as one means to remedy past discrimination has been upheld regularly throughout the federal courts of appeals”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “the use of quotas or goals under Title VII without regard to specific victims as one means to remedy past discrimination has been upheld regularly throughout the federal courts of appeals”
- "since a consent decree reaches into the future and has continuing effect, the district court must take an active role in its on this Court vacating its prior judgment. That basis...is woefully insufficient[]”
- “Writing for the Court in Weber, Justice Brennan went out of his way, on at least eleven different occasions, to point out that what was there before the Court was private affirmative action”
- rejecting Dr. Ben-dick’s analysis of the relevant labor market as erroneous
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GEE, Circuit Judge,
with whom GAR-WOOD, Circuit Judge, joins, specially concurring:
Judge Williams’ thorough opinion establishes that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to approve one among many provisions of a consent decree designed to eradicate discrimination against black officers in the New Orleans Police Department — a one-for-one promotion quota of lengthy duration that is unsupported even by the evidence of the complainants’ labor economist. See 729 F.2d at 1561-1562 (Williams’ op.). My views are generally in accord with those expressed in the dissent of Judge Reavley from the panel opinion, to be found at 694 F.2d 987 , 997-998. No more is required to affirm the district court’s judgment, and I would write no more.
I cannot join in the opinion’s general approbation of racial quotas for governmental entities. I do not believe that the Constitution authorizes the imposition of a decree that requires a unit of state government to discriminate on the basis of race without reference to whether those favored have ever been the victims of discrimination or those injured have either practiced or benefited from it. Certainly I do not believe that any decision of the United States Supreme Court blesses such a measure. Writing for the Court in Weber, 1 Justice Brennan went out of his way, on at least eleven different occasions, to point out that what was there before the Court was private affirmative action. He also specifically stated that the Court in Weber was not concerned with “what a court might order to remedy a past proved violation of the Act” 2 (and I note that here there is no finding of past violation, merely a likelihood of a prima facie case).
Such quotas are desperate measures, inherently invidious as calculated denials of the rights of one citizen in order to enhance those of another — both done on the frank ground of race. If they are ever appropriate, in my view, that can only be as a last resort, when it is clear that nothing else will suffice. See Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.1974). Their employment in casual social tinkering by the courts is dangerous and unwise; I would lend it no unnecessary credence. Since Judge Williams’ opinion does so, I concur in the result only.
. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 , 99 S.Ct. 2721 , 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979).
. 443 U.S. at 200, 99 S.Ct. at 2725 .