concluding that “the consequences of liquidation do constitute irreparable injury” because Section 516A of the Trade Agreements Act “permits liquidation in accordance with a favorable decision of the trial court ... only on merchandise entered after the court decision is published or on entries ‘the liquidation of which was enjoined’ ”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “the consequences of liquidation do constitute irreparable injury” because Section 516A of the Trade Agreements Act “permits liquidation in accordance with a favorable decision of the trial court ... only on merchandise entered after the court decision is published or on entries ‘the liquidation of which was enjoined’ ”
- explaining that once liquidation occurs, a subsequent court decision on the merits can have no effect on the antidump-ing duties assessed on the liquidated entries, even if the duties ultimately are determined to be erroneous
- explaining that once liquidation occurs, a subsequent court decision on the merits can have no effect on the AD duties assessed on the liquidated entries, even if the duties ultimately are determined to be erroneous
- holding that liquidation of entries during the pendency of' litigation challenging an administrative review negates a plaintiffs right to meaningful judicial review and, thus, constitutes per se irreparable harm
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NIES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority that Zenith’s motion for a preliminary injunction must be reconsidered by the trial court. However, in my view, Zenith may or may not have proved sufficient injury under the circumstances of this case to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
I am entirely in agreement with the trial court in rejecting plaintiff’s argument that “any liquidation of entries prior to a final decision would constitute irreparable harm per se ” and that the granting of a preliminary injunction enjoining the administering authorities from liquidating entries should be the exception rather than the general rule. Moreover, I also agree that the requirements which must generally be met before a preliminary injunction is granted are a threat of immediate irreparable harm; a showing that the public interest would be better served by issuing than by denying the injunction; a likelihood of success on the merits; and the balance of hardship on the parties-in-interest favors the party seeking injunctive relief (S.J. Stile Associates, Ltd. v. Dennis Snyder, 646 F.2d 522 (Cust. & Pat.App.1981)). However, I am of the view that, while these factors should be analyzed separately, they must be evaluated as a whole. A very strong showing of public interest in preservation of the status quo, for example, may shore up a minimal showing of direct personal injury to the litigant.
Moreover, I do not believe that rigid rules or requirements are appropriate in the exercise of equitable power. Other factors, not enumerated above, may also affect the evaluation of a litigant’s need for an injunction.
I see no danger that injunctions against liquidation will become the norm if Zenith is found to be injured on the basis of something less than the detailed showing of harm to its current business comparable' to that established by the plaintiff in Smith-Corona Group, Consumer Products Division v. United States, 507 F.Supp. 1015 (C.I.T.1980). Likelihood of success on the merits and balancing of hardships on the parties present formidable obstacles to the granting of an injunction, particularly where the injury factor is weak.
In this appeal, the trial court’s decision presents us with an analysis of the single factor of irreparable harm to Zenith. The finding below was not that Zenith will suffer no harm. Rather, the court held that such harm was not irreparable. In some instances no analysis of other factors may be necessary. However, I think such cases are rare and this case is not one of them. This case, in my view, requires an evaluation and balancing of all factors raised by Zenith.