Opinion

Deborah Kent v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services

  • 710 F.2d 110
  • 2 Soc. Serv. Rev. 229
  • 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 26505
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Jun 22, 1983
Status
Published
Author
Adams
On the bench
Adams, Weis, Becker
Cited by
1,063 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.3%

stating, in reference to the sub stantial evidence test, that “[a] single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the Secretary ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.”

How later courts described this case

  • stating, in reference to the sub stantial evidence test, that “[a] single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the Secretary ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.”
  • explaining that substantial evidence standard is not “a talismanic or self-executing formula for adjudication” and that it requires “qualitative exercise”
  • explaining the substantial evidence standard is not “a talismanic or self-executing formula for adjudication,” rather, the standard requires a “qualitative exercise”
  • holding that an ALJ’s own medical analysis which is contrary to medical evidence is invalid

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,

concurring in the judgment.

I agree that the order of the district court should be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings, although my reasons for this disposition differ from those of the majority.

The Secretary does not seem to have met his burden of showing that Kent has the capacity to perform sedentary work, but I am reluctant so to conclude without affording the Secretary an opportunity to explain with greater clarity the decision reached in this matter. The ALJ’s explanation of his disposition is obscure, and “[i]t would be improper for us to speculate as to [his] reasoning process.... ” Schaaf v. Mat *117 thews, 574 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir.1978). Out of an abundance of caution, therefore, I would vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, rather than reverse. 1

. The Secretary may consider it appropriate to take additional evidence. This is a matter best left to the discretion of the Secretary. Cf. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 -707-08 (3d Cir. 1981).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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