Opinion

United States v. Martorano, Raymond, A/K/A Lon John

  • 709 F.2d 863
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Jul 8, 1983
Status
Published
Author
Gibbons
On the bench
Higginbotham, Aldisert, Gibbons, Hig-Ginbotham
Cited by
51 cases

holding that constructive possession where informant gave defendant keys to van containing marijuana was not negated by presence of law enforcement who had no intention of letting van be driven away

How later courts described this case

  • holding that constructive possession where informant gave defendant keys to van containing marijuana was not negated by presence of law enforcement who had no intention of letting van be driven away
  • finding a defendant to be in constructive possession when he possessed a key to a vehicle containing a controlled substance and had previously entered into an agreement to purchase and transfer drugs
  • holding that law enforcement officers should not be required to allow suspect time to escape prior to arresting suspect for possession
  • Constructive possession “[ejxists when one does not have physical custody or possession, but is in a position to exercise dominion and control over a thing.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

The central issue presented by this appeal is the extent to which the federal courts will read into federal criminal statutes legal fictions thrice compounded for the purpose of facilitating the government’s practice of overcharging with respect to cases in which it has provided the wherewithal of crime through its stables of criminal informants. In this instance the government’s chosen instrument was Ronald Raiton, a notorious long-term professional criminal, who, when caught, signed on to bait the trap for others. He successfully baited a trap for the conspirators, Raymond Martorano, John Berkery and Frank Vadino, by informing them that he could deliver a van containing 50 gallons of P2P for $100,000.

A taped conversation establishes that Martorano, Berkery and Vadino, as early as June 10, 1981, conspired, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976), to possess the 52 gallons found in the van. There is no question that the conspiracy continued through July 28, 1981, when arrests were made. The jury found Martorano guilty of conspiracy. He was sentenced to a five year term on the conspiracy count to be followed by three years of special parole. Martorano does not appeal the judgment of sentence on the conspiracy count. He does appeal a consecutive five year sentence imposed for possession of the 52 gallons of P2P with intent to distribute, contending that while from the evidence the jury could find that he conspired to possess with intent to distribute, *872 no reasonable person could conclude that the conspiracy succeeded, even momentarily-

The reason for the government’s zeal in charging both conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute is quite evident. Section 846 provides that a person who attempts or conspires shall be punished by imprisonment not to exceed the maximum for the offense the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. P2P is a Schedule II controlled substance, and the maximum sentence for possession of it with intent to distribute is five years. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). Thus Martorano has received the maximum jail sentence permitted for the aborted conspiracy. But by resorting to the patent fiction that the conspiracy actually succeeded, for some metaphysical moment at least, the government has succeeded in doubling the maximum sentence for the section 846 offense. I can understand the overzealousness of the Drug Enforcement Administration in attempting to maximize incarcerations resulting from its use of the notorious Mr. Raiton. Why my colleagues in the majority should so share that overzealousness as to rewrite section 841, turning it into a conspiracy or attempt statute, is a question beyond my comprehension.

The P2P in question originated in a federal storage facility for controlled substances in Florida. There was never a moment — not the smallest fraction of the earth’s rotation — during which the P2P was not completely and effectively subject to the physical domination and control of agents of the federal government. The conspiracy offense was well advanced before Raiton, on July 28, 1981, rented a van in which delivery was to be made. In renting the van Raiton acted, not on behalf of the conspirators, but on behalf of his principal, the United States government. Raiton turned the van over to the F.B.I., which placed the federal government’s property in its rear compartment, the doors of which were padlocked and which was inaccessible from the cab. The van was parked in Philadelphia on the south side of Pine Street between 19th and 20th Streets. Raiton was not given possession of the van. Instead he was given the ignition key and a padlock key and instructed to meet Martorano at a prearranged rendezvous in Rittenhouse Square.

While Raiton was completing the rendezvous with Martorano, eleven law enforcement officers had the locked van under close and constant surveillance. These included agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration, F.B.I. agents, and Philadelphia police officers. F.B.I. Agent Widman was assigned the task of watching to see if anyone approached the van, and to signal the other ten officers in that event.

At the rendezvous spot in Rittenhouse Square Martorano asked Raiton to write down the description of the van and its location so it could be checked out. Raiton did so, and Martorano gave this information to Yadino. Martorano then gave Raiton a shoebox containing $100,000, and Raiton placed the ignition key and the padlock key on the park bench. Vadino, meanwhile, went to inspect the van. He and another conspirator, DeTullio, returned to Ritten-house Square, where Martorano gave De-Tullio the key. DeTullio returned to the van. He did not attempt to open the padlock, because Raiton’s suggested method of transfer was that the van would be driven to another location. Obviously the government agents were perfectly confident that no attempt would be made to unload 52 gallons of P2P on Pine Street in center city. DeTullio approached the driver’s compartment, opened the door, sat in the seat, and put the ignition key in the ignition. There is no evidence that he even started the engine. He was arrested immediately. The van never moved an inch prior to the arrest. The P2P never moved an inch. De-Tullio never even saw it.

The government concedes that Martorano never had actual possession of the P2P. It urges, and the majority agrees, that he had constructive possession. The majority’s discussion of constructive possession starts with the observation that “judicial interpretation of the nature of ‘dominion and con- *873 possession are conflicting.” Typescript p. 8. What is noticeably missing in the opinion, however, is any disclosure of which of the conflicting interpretations it purports to adopt as the test for this circuit. Instead there is a seriatim description of the holdings in a series of cases which are said to be either distinguishable or satisfied. But unless interpretation of criminal statutes is to degenerate into an exercise in fantasy, a definition of the term “possession,” even if dressed up with adjectives like constructive, must have some relationship with physical reality.

The extent to which the majority has journeyed into fantasy land is perhaps best illustrated by its reliance, typescript 9, 10, on the fact that Martorano was attempting to possess the P2P. “Martorano was not acting as a philanthropist to benefit the people of Rittenhouse Square.” Id. Of course he wasn’t and he has been found guilty of a violation of section 841. But his “attempt” was no more successful than if Raiton had handed him a key for a different vehicle or a different padlock, or for a vehicle from which the distributor rotor had been removed. That Martorano thought he was obtaining constructive possession is simply irrelevant. When he gained possession of the key the government still maintained effective and total dominion and control over its 52 gallons of P2P. Marto-rano had simply been defrauded by the ingenious Mr. Raiton. He no more gained any actual control over the P2P than did any other passerby in Rittenhouse Square.

When Martorano gave the keys to DeTul-lio, his actual control over the P2P increased not an iota. The van was still under surveillance by eleven government agents. All the participants understood that the P2P was not to be unloaded on Pine Street. There is no evidence from which a jury could find that the government had any intention of permitting the van to be moved. The arrest was almost instantaneous; so much so that there is no evidence that the ignition key was turned. 1 Yet the majority fantasizes that “DeTullio exercised dominion and control over the P2P by virtue of his actual possession of the van in which it was contained.” DeTullio had no more actual possession of the van, in the sense that he had any realistic chance of moving it, than had it been locked in the basement of the Federal Building. The surveilling agents never intended to relinquish and never relinquished effective total control over the large quantity of government property contained in it.

The ultimate cynicism of the majority position is disclosed in the last full paragraph of its opinion, which reasons:

Martorano’s petition thus reduces itself to his insistence that the agents afford him and his co-conspirators an opportunity to dispose of the controlled substance before Martorano can be convicted of possession with intent to distribute it.... To require also that the police allow the criminals to escape with the drugs would place an impossible burden on the police and on the courts seeking to enforce criminal statutes as well as to contribute to the very evil that the statute is intended to eliminate.

Typescript, 17-18. One can accept this tortured reasoning only if one accepts that the prevention of crime is not in itself a worthy object of law enforcement. Thwarting a threatened homicide, rape or robbery while it is still in the attempt or conspiracy stage seems, to me at least, a perfectly worthy object of law enforcement. It would be weird, to say the least, to accept the premise that the unsuccessful killer, rapist or robber could nevertheless be convicted, substantively, of constructive murder, rape or robbery. In this instance the government took perfectly appropriate steps to prevent Martorano and his fellow conspirators from gaining possession of the P2P with intent to distribute it, by maintaining governmental possession and control throughout the entire transaction. The suggestion of the majority that if we refuse *874 to recognize the plain fact that the violation of section 841 was successfully prevented we will “require ... that the police allow the criminals to escape with the drugs,” id. 17 , is completely illogical. It is also insulting to those dedicated agents of the federal government whose primary responsibility is crime prevention.

The issue in this case is not the phony one constructed by the majority of how far the government’s agents must go in allowing crime to occur. It is rather how far the United States Attorney can go in relying on potential offenses which have been successfully prevented in order to pyramid sentences for conspiracy or attempt beyond the sentences which Congress has authorized. The majority’s labored effort to read into section 841 a doctrine of constructive criminality so as to justify sentence pyramiding is logically indefensible, morally reprehensible, and a potentially dangerous precedent. Doctrines of constructive criminality should find no place in the jurisprudence of a free society.

Since the section 841 offense was effectively prevented by the government’s maintenance of complete dominion and control of the controlled substance, I would reverse the conviction on that offense.

. That the engine was not started suggests the possibility that the distributor rotor had been removed. Indeed it is hard to believe that the surveilling agents would be so reckless of their own safety and that of the standersby as to neglect that elementary precaution in the circumstances described.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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