explaining that where “the court determines that the jury’s verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, . . . the court must unconditionally order a new trial and cannot give the plaintiff the option to accept a lesser amount”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that where “the court determines that the jury’s verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, . . . the court must unconditionally order a new trial and cannot give the plaintiff the option to accept a lesser amount”
- explaining that the “very essence” of the factfinders duty at trial is to “select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable”
- concluding that the defendant waived its objection to jury instructions on appeal where it failed to object to those instructions at trial
- ordering remittitur under Colorado law where non-economic damages were “134 times the amount of the actual financial loss” of $30,000 and punitive damages alone were 100 times this amount
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Sarah M. Spaeth v. Union Oil Company of California, a Corporation, 710 F.2d 1455 (1983)
10 Cir., 703 F.2d 1152, and conclude that it is inapposite because of factual differences and because it applies Colorado law whereas the instant case is governed by Oklahoma law.
The opinion
SETH, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and also indicate a disagreement with some of the concurring opinions. In my view, the problem in this appeal does not arise from the fact of, nor from the amount of, the punitive damages. Instead, the error in the verdict and judgment is that the compensatory damages are excessive and were the result of passion and prejudice. The compensatory award was $1,030,000.00.
The record shows that the damages complained of were from a variety of sources, there were preexisting problems, the testimony was by lay witnesses as to their subjective evaluations, there were marital problems, the alleged forgery and the extensive participation by the husband. The amount of money involved must also be included. It was in this context that there was injected the passion and prejudice resulting mostly from the outbursts by the plaintiff in the courtroom. The result was that a large measure of punitive damages was included in the compensatory award. The amount of the compensatory damages is just too large to be otherwise explained. I don’t think this can be cured by a reduction in the amount of punitive damages. The general view is that there should be no remittitur where there is passion and prejudice. Again, considering the amount of money invested by plaintiff and her then existing condition, the compensatory damage award must be grossly excessive.
It is apparent that appellate courts may order remittitur. The question remains as to how it should be exercised. I would limit it to formula cases, Big O Tire Dealers v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir.), or double recovery cases and other instances where there is present some *1186 adequate measure for a reduction. I find no measure whatever in the case before us and thus would hold that a remand for a new trial is required.
The awarded punitive amount is not too far out of line comparing it to the excessive compensatory award and the position of the defendant. The remittitur ordered by the majority moves the punitive award from the higher end of the ratio or scale to the lower end. This is done with the comments in the panel opinion that the award is excessive and unwarranted. This again points to the excessive nature of the compensatory award not the punitive damage award.
I would thus remand the case for a new trial on all issues.