Opinion

Eli Mesirow and Thomas Morris v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., a Connecticut Corporation

  • 703 F.2d 339
  • 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1349
  • 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 31081
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jan 25, 1983
Status
Published
Author
Boochever
On the bench
Boochever, Duniway, Fletcher
Cited by
41 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.3%

assuming without deciding that a client can appeal from an order imposing sanctions on his attorney

How later courts described this case

  • assuming without deciding that a client can appeal from an order imposing sanctions on his attorney
  • dismissing for lack of jurisdiction appeal from order imposing sanctions on non-party attorney which was not appealed until after final judgment
  • rejecting price- fixing claim where a distributor delivered and maintained a manufacturer’s products for a commission
  • defendant promoted and serviced direct-billed accounts

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I would not address the issue of whether an attorney in a case may wait until final judgment to appeal sanctions imposed during the earlier course of proceedings. We *346 have permitted attorneys to file appeals within thirty days from the entry of orders imposing such sanctions, Reygo Pacific Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 648 (9th Cir. 1982); Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1981); until now, we have never ruled on whether the attorney’s appeal may also be joined with that of the party at the conclusion of the case. There are strong policy reasons against piecemeal appeals which weigh in favor of encouraging the joinder of the attorney’s appeal with that of his client. 1 I believe, however, that we have no jurisdiction to resolve the issue at this time.

There were multiple claims and counterclaims filed in this case. On September 4, 1981, the trial judge ruled only on plaintiff’s antitrust claims and entered judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. § 54(b) as to those claims alone. Moreover, the notice of appeal refers only to “the judgment entered pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. § 54(b) ... on September 4, 1981.” Thus, our jurisdiction is limited to review of those antitrust claims and we have no authority to consider the appeal from imposition of sanctions.

. Eastern Maico Distributors, Inc. v. Maico-Fahrezeugfabrick, 658 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1981). See also C. Wright, A. Miller, C. Cooper 15 Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3911, 498-99 (1976).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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