holding, relying on United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 633 (9th Cir. 1971), that information may be considered if its accuracy is undisputed; however, verification must be produced to show its probable accuracy, if disputed by the defendant
How later courts described this case
- holding, relying on United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 633 (9th Cir. 1971), that information may be considered if its accuracy is undisputed; however, verification must be produced to show its probable accuracy, if disputed by the defendant
- holding that court erred in as suming that prosecutor’s decision to drop some charges as part of a plea bargain meant there was evidence of defendant’s complicity in those dropped charges
- both cases refusing to apply the Frady analysis to collateral appeals of sentences under § 2255
- "Rule 11 explicitly requires that courts explain any `special parole' consequences . . . because they are cumulative to any prison term imposed, and therefore effectively expand the maximum possible sentence for the offense."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in United States v. James A. Essig
696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 970
The opinion
ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Although I concur with the majority, I write separately to emphasize what I consider to be the central holding of the Court today: namely, that a district judge may not, when sentencing a defendant, rely on inferences of possible participation in other crimes based solely on the government’s promise not to prosecute for such other crimes. Due process demands that there be something justifying dependence on a particular factor before a judge may make that factor a basis, even in part, of a sentence. 1 Because a promise not to prosecute, without more, is not a reliable indicator of criminal involvement, it cannot be used as the predicate for an adverse evaluation of the defendant’s character. This seems particularly so here, since the letter from the prosecutor to the Parole Commission made this abundantly clear. Inasmuch as it appears from the record that the district court in this case based its sentencing decision partially on the government’s promise not to prosecute for certain alleged crimes, I agree that the matter should be remanded so that the defendant may be resentenced.
. See Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179 (3d Cir.1979); Note, A Proposal to Ensure Accuracy in Presentence Investigation Reports, 91 Yale L.J. 1225 (1982).