Opinion

William Edwards v. Aetna Life Insurance Company

  • 690 F.2d 595
  • 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 24764
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Oct 18, 1982
Status
Published
Author
Kennedy
On the bench
Edwards, Kennedy, Cele-Brezze
Cited by
362 cases

explaining that for this factor to cut in favor of judicial estoppel, the party to be estopped need not have finally prevailed on the merits in the first proceeding, so long as that the first court adopted the position urged by the party, either as a preliminary matter or as part of a final disposition

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that for this factor to cut in favor of judicial estoppel, the party to be estopped need not have finally prevailed on the merits in the first proceeding, so long as that the first court adopted the position urged by the party, either as a preliminary matter or as part of a final disposition
  • explaining that the essential 5 function of judicial estoppel is to prevent intentional inconsistency and that the object of the doctrine is to protect the judiciary, as an institution, from the perversion of judicial machinery
  • assessing the plaintiff’s positions before a federal agency, Veterans Affairs, and before a federal court sitting in diversity
  • stating that the judicial estoppel “question primarily concerns federal interests”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

CORNELIA G. KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in all of the majority’s opinion except that portion which holds that the proceeding before the administrator which resulted in the award of benefits was a settlement of Edwards’ claim. The majority states that “[t]he administrator has chosen to pay Edwards his claim because pursuing the claim through the administrative process was not warranted.” At 599-600. I see the payment of Edwards’ claim as a considered decision that he was entitled to the benefits claimed. I would extend the doctrine of judicial estoppel to formal claim adjudications by governmental agencies of the type involved here whether they acted after a hearing or without a hearing because one was not found to be necessary.

The statute requires that those seeking disability benefits file a claim in the form prescribed by the administrator of the Veterans Administration. The regulations provide that:

(a) Authority is delegated to the Chief Benefits Director and to supervisory or adjudicative personnel within the jurisdiction of the Department of Veterans Benefits designated by him to make findings and decisions under the applicable laws, regulations, precedents, and instructions, as to entitlement of claimants to benefits under all laws administered by the Veterans Administration governing the payment of monetary benefits to veterans and their dependents, within the jurisdiction of Compensation and Pension Service.

38 C.F.R. § 3.100 . The decision to award or deny benefits must be based on evidence submitted in accordance with the regulations ( 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 ) which require that evidence be under oath. 38 C.F.R. § 3.200 . There are time limits on the submission of evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.109 . The regulations provide for hearings at the request of a claimant. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (c). The award when made is final unless it is amended in accordance with the regulations, or is appealed to the Board of Veteran Appeals in accordance with the regulations. 38 C.F.R. § 19.153 . Further, although additional evidence may be offered on appeal, the appeal is decided on the entire record including the evidence submitted to the administrator. 38 C.F.R. § 19.142 . The procedures are as elaborate as those of many courts. Although the person awarding benefits is not titled an administrative law judge but an adjudication officer, the functions performed are not dissimilar. The claims award procedure *601 is sufficiently analogous to quasi-judicial administrative proceedings that it should be accorded the deference of judicial estoppel.

Had the same award been made by the appellate body, the majority would apply judicial estoppel. However, it was not necessary for the appellate body of the Veterans Administration to pass on Edwards’ claim because Edwards was successful in having his position adopted at the lower administrative level. In the case of courts no distinction is made between a final unappealed determination of a trial court and that of an appellate court. Had a hearing been held at the request of the claimant even at this administrative level the majority would presumably find that judicial estoppel was appropriate. I see no reason for applying different standards to the initial administrative decision depending upon whether or not a hearing is held where the decision is surrounded by the extensive regulation and formality accorded here. In either event an official body passed on the merits of Edwards’ claim, resolving it in Edwards’ favor on a basis inconsistent with that urged by Edwards in this Court.

Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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