concluding that “[t]he totality of the particular facts and circumstances in this case clearly demonstrate that [the defendant] made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his fifth amendment rights” based on the fact that the defendant “was twenty-nine years old, intelligent, educated, experienced, alert and articulate.”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “[t]he totality of the particular facts and circumstances in this case clearly demonstrate that [the defendant] made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his fifth amendment rights” based on the fact that the defendant “was twenty-nine years old, intelligent, educated, experienced, alert and articulate.”
- distinguishing a request at the initial appearance for appointed counsel to represent a defendant in further judicial proceedings from a request for counsel with respect to custodial interrogation
- “[A]ny prejudice that the general definition could have caused was eviscerated by the specific instruction that immediately followed.”
- defendant’s request for appointment of counsel to assist him in “further judicial proceedings,” made at arraignment, held not to constitute request for counsel for purposes of subsequent custodial interrogation where, after repeated Miranda warnings, defendant confessed and did not request counsel or attempt to cut off questioning
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463 (1984)
) Similarly, in Jordan v. Watkins (5th Cir. 1982), 681 F.2d 1067, the court held that Witherspoon is inapposite to [a similar peremptory-challenge argument] because it applies solely to the use of challenges for cause.
The opinion
RANDALL, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the panel’s disposition of the issues with respect to the alleged violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, the requested suppression of Jordan’s confession, the jury charge on intent and the challenge to his sentence based on unchanneled jury discretion at the sentencing phase, and I therefore concur in the result.
Because the panel has correctly found that the sentencing procedure under which the death penalty was imposed constitutionally infirm, I see no need to address the questions decided by the panel concerning the constitutionality, under the ex post fac-to and due process clauses, of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s interpretation in Jackson and in this case of the now-repealed Mississippi statutes. We have remanded this case to the district court for a determination by the State of Mississippi whether to conduct a new sentencing hearing or to vacate Jordan’s death sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Any new sentencing hearing will be held under the new Mississippi statutes. In view of this disposition, there is no need to determine whether the Mississippi Supreme Court’s interpretation in Jackson and in this case of the now repealed (and wholly inapplicable) Mississippi statutes is constitutionally infirm.