Opinion

United States v. Nelson Bell

  • 678 F.2d 547
  • 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18818
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Jun 1, 1982
Status
Published
Author
Anderson
On the bench
III, Roney, God-Bold, Godbold, Ro-Ney, Tjoflat, Hill, Fay, Vance, Kravitch, Johnson, Henderson, Hatchett, Anderson, Clark
Cited by
759 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.3%

explaining that a jury need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and noting that circumstantial evidence is not intrinsically different from testimonial evidence

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that a jury need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and noting that circumstantial evidence is not intrinsically different from testimonial evidence
  • "By allowing the prosecutor's remarks to pass uncorrected, over defense counsel's objection, . . . the district court implied that the remarks were unobjectionable."
  • where the prosecutor's improper comments related to the defendant's discussion of bank surveillance photographs with his trial counsel, not his bad character
  • a jury verdict of guilt must stand if “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

*550 R. LANIER ANDERSON, III, Circuit Judge, joined by RONEY, Circuit Judge,

specially concurring:

I concur in the opinion, and I write separately only to state my understanding that Judge Vance’s opinion does not change the substantive law of this circuit with respect to the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence. To say that the evidence is sufficient if “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” supra at 549, is not substantively different from saying that the evidence is sufficient if a reasonable trier of fact could find that the “evidence was inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1981). It is true that “[i]t is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt,” supra at 549, but it is equally true that if a hypothesis of innocence is sufficiently reasonable and sufficiently strong, then a reasonable trier of fact must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt about guilt.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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