explaining that “[pjroof that discrimination exists within occupational categories may well support an inference of workplace-wide discrimination,” and noting that the court’s “sole point is that, in the first instance, comparisons must hone in on similarly qualified employees”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[pjroof that discrimination exists within occupational categories may well support an inference of workplace-wide discrimination,” and noting that the court’s “sole point is that, in the first instance, comparisons must hone in on similarly qualified employees”
- holding that statistics that "did not demonstrate that women received grade increases less often than men as a regular occurrence" failed to establish disparate impact
- showing a 15.9% promotion rate for white applicants in 2004 compared to a 17.2% overall rate, a 14.2% rate in 2005 compared to a 15.2% overall rate, a 17.6% rate in 2006 compared to a 17.6% overall rate, a 14.0% rate in 2007 compared to a 14.1% overall rate, and a 17.6% rate in 2008 compared to a 16.9% overall rate
- defining a continuing violation as “a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period, or the maintenance of a discriminatory system both before and during the [limitations] period”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Statement On Rehearing
WALD, Circuit Judge.
I am voting to deny rehearing and concurred in this opinion originally, on the premise that a prima facie case of sex-based employment discrimination must provide a reasonable basis for inferring that similarly qualified men and women are treated dif *74 ferently. As the opinion explains, the data offered in this case was not sufficiently reliable to support such an inference. See majority op. at 69-71. In particular, plaintiff’s attempt to control for “special degrees” in her regression analysis failed because of the haphazard method by which such data were collected. See majority op. at 70 n.21. See also Tr. V, p. 47 (Testimony of Dr. Gastwirth). It does not follow, however, as the petitions for rehearing suggest, that plaintiffs will be required to provide job-specific data for every job requiring special qualifications. Thus I assume that in appropriate cases, plaintiffs may be able to make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment by employing reliable data that aggregate across jobs requiring specialized training. In each case, the critical question is whether there is a reasonable basis for inferring disparate treatment.