in action where association was held in civil contempt for failure to comply with injunctive order, district court did not abuse discretion by awarding local union reasonable attorney fees incurred in prosecuting contempt
How later courts described this case
- in action where association was held in civil contempt for failure to comply with injunctive order, district court did not abuse discretion by awarding local union reasonable attorney fees incurred in prosecuting contempt
- calling the issue “an interesting question” but not reaching it due to contemnor’s willful disobedience
- construing labor contract to bind Association, and not just some of its constituents
- court did not discuss fact that appellee sought to dismiss appeal on this basis
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STAPLETON, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the conclusions reached in Section II of the Court’s Opinion; I respectfully dissent from those reached in Sections III and IV.
Subject matter jurisdiction in this case is predicated on Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and exists solely because the plaintiff union, Local 249, seeks redress for a “violation of [a] contract . . . between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 185 . At this point, there is no dispute that the District Court properly enjoined employers with whom Local 249 had entered a collective bargaining agreement “from requiring any and all employees represented by . . . [Local 249] to spot trailers in any area which has not been mutually agreed to between . . . [Local 249 and the Association].” Order of October 11, 1978, Par. 3. The *86 point currently at issue is whether the Court properly enjoined employers with whom Local 249 had not entered a collective bargaining agreement from requiring employees whom Local 249 did not represent to spot trailers in Allegheny County. The District Court held that it could properly do so and this Court today affirms that holding. Neither Court, however, has identified a contractual provision which entitles Local 249 to have non-Allegheny County employers refrain from spotting in Allegheny County. Because I am also unable to identify such a contractual provision, I would hold that the District Court’s injunction, as ultimately construed by it, exceeded its jurisdiction.
The District Court confronted the jurisdictional issue and concluded that a contractual relationship between Local 249 and those enjoined was unnecessary:
Lastly, defendant contends that plaintiff . . . could only seek relief against defendant’s Allegheny County employers who employ plaintiff’s members. As such, it is urged that the injunction could only bind defendant’s Allegheny County employers. The underlying basis of this contention is the fact that plaintiff’s only contractual relationship is with Allegheny County member employers.
Defendant’s position in this regard is unjustified. The problem confronting plaintiff vis a vis defendant’s non-Allegheny County employer members is substantial. These non-Allegheny County employers, unencumbered by any restriction on spotting, would be free to conduct business in Allegheny County armed with a significant competitive advantage. Surely, plaintiff need not passively watch non-Allegheny County employers prosper within plaintiff’s own jurisdiction at the expense of its own membership because there is no privity of contract. This Court believes that plaintiff could certainly request relief from practices of non-Allegheny County member employers of defendant who themselves have voluntarily chosen to transact business within plaintiff’s jurisdiction. Were it otherwise, defendant’s non-Allegheny County employer members would enjoy a gratuitous immunity from suit in connection with actions occurring within Allegheny County. Such an immunity would seriously jeopardize the ever present goal of industrial peace. (Emphasis supplied).
This conclusion is fundamentally unsound and conflicts with the well established law reviewed in Teamsters Local 30 v. Helms Exp., Inc., 591 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1979). The purpose of Section 301 is to provide a federal forum for the enforcement of contractual obligations voluntarily assumed by employers or labor organizations. It does not empower the federal courts to grant relief when no underlying contractual right exists.
The majority opinion acknowledges the necessity of “a contractual relationship to vest the District Court with Section 301 jurisdiction over all of the Association’s members.” It then finds the “requisite . . . relationship” in the “interlocking network of agreements between and among the Association’s Allegheny County and non-Allegheny County members, Local 249, and other Teamster locals.” The Court does not, however, identify any contractual provision which the injunction against the non-Allegheny County employers enforces. 1 In the absence of such a provision, I would hold that an injunction against those employers cannot stand.
. Local 249’s complaint alleged that the defendant Association was violating a restriction on spotting contained in Article 44 of a collective bargaining agreement referred to as the Supplemental Local Agreement. Article 44 is a “Maintenance of Standards” provision which contains a covenant that “the Employer” will maintain “all conditions of employment in his individual operation relating to wages, hours of work, overtime differentials and general working conditions ... at rot less than the highest standards in effect at the time of the signing of” the agreement. On the basis of the current record, I am unwilling to hold that this provision whs intended to create contract rights between an employer and a Union which does not represent any of that employer’s employees.