holding that “chronology of events” evidence supplemented by a legislator’s affidavit stating that the plaintiffs lawsuit had been discussed pri- or to passage of an amendment was insufficient evidence of a causal link
How later courts described this case
- holding that “chronology of events” evidence supplemented by a legislator’s affidavit stating that the plaintiffs lawsuit had been discussed pri- or to passage of an amendment was insufficient evidence of a causal link
- recognizing that an affidavit from a member of the conference committee that drafted the legislation “might be entitled to some weight if it had been made contemporaneously with the passage of the legislation”
- holding plaintiffs not prevailing parties where their lawsuit did not act as a " ‘material factor in bringing about the defendant’s action’”
- affirming the denial of attorney’s fees where plaintiffs had not shown “some sort of clear, causal relationship between the litigation brought and the practical outcome realized.” Id. at 188 (emphasis in original)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BRUCE R. THOMPSON, District Judge,
concurring:
I concur and write separately only to emphasize that portion of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 which provides: “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee.... ” (Emphasis supplied). Judge Wright’s discussion of “Legislative Interpretation” plainly demonstrates that by court decision construing the perceived legislative will, the area of discretion has been narrowly circumscribed. I think it important to observe that the trial court exercises a normal discretion concerning the issue at hand. If appellants were “prevailing parties” it is because the lawsuit was a “significant catalyst” in effectuating the legislative change. This, at best, is an uncertain, elusive, and imponderable concept; the very kind of issue which cries for reliance on informed discretion.
*189 The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule. The Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9 . When invoked as a guide to judicial action it means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 , 51 S.Ct. 243, 247 , 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931). See also Stanton v. United States, 226 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1955).
In the present case, the district court had before it the affidavit of State Representative Nelson which averred that “the lawsuit . .. was an important factor in leading the House to repeal the challenged former law.” The lawsuit was filed in late August 1976. The respondents’ affidavits showed, without contradiction, that as early as August 1971 the Washington Secretary of State met with representatives of several minor political parties to discuss amendments to the Washington statutes; that during the summer of 1974 the staff of the Secretary of State prepared a comprehensive legislative proposal to cure deficiencies in the law; that during the 1976 legislative session the House and Senate Committees on Elections conducted public hearings concerning numerous problems noted under existing election laws; that among the problems was the constitutionality of existing laws; that the committees had before them, among other information, a “Summary of Proposal on Minor Party Nominating Procedures” which stated, inter alia “In light of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions extending the equal protection provisions of the Federal constitution to any state regulation of political participation, the continued validity of this state’s statutory procedures for the nomination of partisan candidates by minor political parties may be questionable.”- After all this spade work had been done, the 1977 legislature enacted the legislation which mooted the lawsuit.
In the light of this record it cannot be said that the district court acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in exercising discretion to deny attorney fees.