Opinion

United States v. Edward D. Patterson, Richard L. Flintoff, Jimmie R. Oglesby, and Gregory C. Martinson

  • 648 F.2d 625
  • 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12328
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jun 15, 1981
Status
Published
Author
Poole
On the bench
Wright, Poole, Norris
Cited by
82 cases

holding that “[ojrdering [the driver] from the car was also a reasonable precaution” in the context of investigating a narcotics deal

How later courts described this case

  • holding that “[ojrdering [the driver] from the car was also a reasonable precaution” in the context of investigating a narcotics deal
  • a valid stop is not transformed into an arrest merely because law enforcement agents momentarily restrict a person’s freedom of movement; “[t]he Constitution does not require them [police officers] to have given him [suspect] a head start.. . . Blocking the car was a reasonable precaution to ensure that the inquiry would not be terminated prematurely”
  • noting that any juror prejudice against one defendant would “carry over to such persons closely associated with him in the jurors’ minds”
  • defendant in driver’s seat with motor running at scene of arrest of other defendant

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

POOLE, Circuit Judge,

concurring specially.

I concur in the reversal of the convictions of appellants Patterson, Martinson, and Flintoff, for the reasons stated in the majority opinion. I also concur in affirming appellant Oglesby’s conviction. However, I do not believe it is possible to justify the officers’ approach to Oglesby on a founded suspicion analysis. Oglesby had never been *635 seen by the officers during this long investigation. The only “objective manifestations” that Oglesby was, or was about to be, involved in criminal activity were vague references to things that one of the officers heard, from a source unidentified to us, about the color of a car seen at another point during the stakeout, and the connection of someone with a band. Such tenuous assertions cannot form the basis for founded suspicion. Had Oglesby remained silent, I would hold that there was no basis for an investigatory stop and that his conviction should be reversed.

However, Oglesby did not remain silent; rather, immediately and voluntarily he told the officers that he had a gun. In these circumstances, justification of the officers’ approach to him becomes unnecessary. Even without prior reason to connect Ogles-by with any wrongdoing, once he had spontaneously confessed to possession of a concealed weapon, they were justified in taking it and in arresting him. I do not think that justice is served by stretching for founded suspicion, especially where the exercise is not necessary. Hence, I would affirm Oglesby’s conviction on these grounds.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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