discussing various types of plea agreements; noting “a prosecutor may provide leniency to a defendant’s accomplices”
How later courts described this case
- discussing various types of plea agreements; noting “a prosecutor may provide leniency to a defendant’s accomplices”
- “If a defendant understands the charges against him, understands the consequences of a guilty plea, and voluntarily chooses to plead guilty, without being coerced to do so, the guilty plea and any concomitant agreement will be upheld on federal review.”
- requirements of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 on colloquy before court accepts guilty plea are not binding on states and do not necessarily mirror constitutional standards
- “[The government] is free to encourage guilty pleas by offering substantial benefits to a defendant, or by threatening an accused with more severe punishment should a negotiated plea be refused.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by James Edward Ehl v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, 656 F.2d 166 (1981)
646 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1980) has cast doubt on the applicability of
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Washington, 39 Conn. App. 175 (1995)
Blackburn is distinguishable from this case because iaBlackbum, the defendant’s counsel asked the judge for a sentence proposal, and, therefore, the propriety of the judge’s participation in the plea bargaining was not in question.
The opinion
RUBIN, Circuit Judge, with whom RANDALL, Circuit Judge,
joins, dissenting.
All plea bargaining, whether for reduced sentences, elimination of counts or for lesser offenses, involves negotiation for an admission of guilt to a criminal offense in return for a promise of benefits from the state. Such bargaining compromises both the state’s interest in law enforcement and the individual’s personal liberty. It is tolerable only because of the exigencies of our law enforcement mechanisms and of our system of criminal courts. However, save for the fact that the result is negotiated, plea bargaining is fundamentally different from the compromise of civil litigation. The values, the stakes and the interest of society are all different. See Rubin, How We Can Improve Judicial Treatment of Individual Cases Without Sacrificing Individual Rights: The Problems of the Criminal Law, The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future (A. Leo Levin & R. Wheeler, eds. 1976), reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 79 , at 177, 183-86 (1976), and the authorities cited therein. Therefore, I cannot join in Part I of my brother Hill’s dissent.
I agree fully, however, with his analysis in Parts II, III, IV and V and the conclusion he reaches. A trial judge who joins in sentence bargaining enters the contest with infinitely greater bargaining power than the accused. He is seldom completely neutral: absent public interest in the trial of a particular case, it is in his interest to dispose of cases without trial and, thus, to clear his docket with minimal effort. If he may offer the defendant a deal in return for a guilty plea, and then, when this proffer is rejected, impose a greater sentence, without stated and justifiable reasons, he not only exerts coercive pressure on the accused but affects detrimentally the administration of justice in his court. The criminal defense cogniscenti will quickly learn that, when this judge’s proffer is rejected, the defendant, if convicted, will pay a higher price. It is a denial of due process for the judge thus to stain his robes.