stating that “we believe that discrimination manifesting itself in the form of unequal pay cannot, alone, be sufficient to support a finding of constructive discharge”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “we believe that discrimination manifesting itself in the form of unequal pay cannot, alone, be sufficient to support a finding of constructive discharge”
- noting that absent a constructive discharge claim, damages are limited to back pay
- finding that the plaintiff alleged a prima facie case by comparing her salary to her predecessor’s
- in equal pay sex discrimination claim, referring to Young and holding that constructive discharge occurs where “working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because Powell Electrical constructively discharged Mrs. Bourque under this circuit’s law of constructive discharge. Calcote v. Texas Educational Foundation, 578 F.2d 95 (1978); Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Association, 509 F.2d 140 (1975). Mrs. Bourque’s case is one “in which an employee involuntarily resigns in order to escape intolerable and illegal employment requirements.” Young at 144 . She has a statutory entitlement to equal pay under Title VII. Her employer denied her this right.
This particular violation of Title VII did not, by itself, make Mrs. Bourque’s working conditions so intolerable as to force her into an involuntary resignation. She also endured Mr. Powell’s discriminatory statements and his aversion to her promotion to buyer, a job for which she fully qualified. Mr. Powell approved her promotion only after imposing upon her conditions which were not inflicted upon male buyers: a three-month trial period * ; a salary $275 per month lower than her male counterparts; and time clock check-in. Further, upon successful completion of the trial period, even with a raise, Mrs. Bourque’s salary still was over $200 less than either of the males whose duties compared with hers.
These actions are sufficient to constitute working conditions so intolerable as to *67 make Mrs. Bourque’s involuntary resignation a constructive discharge. I do not suggest that any single statutory violation by an employer will necessarily support a finding of constructive discharge, if the employee-discriminatee subsequently resigns. Whether the circumstances warrant a finding of constructive discharge should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Here, the circumstances warrant such a finding.
Though Mrs. Bourque subsequently desired a three-month trial period, Mr. Powell originally created the trial period as a condition precedent to her promotion to buyer.