recognizing that prison officials may not arbitrarily segregate inmates because they are clients of a certain attorney
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that prison officials may not arbitrarily segregate inmates because they are clients of a certain attorney
- burden of overcoming presumption of deference met by showing that prison officials had acted in bad faith and that attorney had not disrupted prison but rather had simply been trying to vindicate prisoners’ rights
- inmates segregated into a separate unit, number of inmates per room doubled, access to the commissary reduced, cell searches increased, recreation and educational programs limited, and inmates made ineligible for good time credits unless inmates would agree to drop lawsuits filed by a certain attorney
- prison officials may not arbitrarily segregate inmates because they are clients of a certain attorney
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GEE, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
With considerable reluctance, I concur in the opinion of the court. My difficulty stems from two sources. The first is that my reading of the record convinces me that Dr. Beto’s actions in the premises were each and all taken in general good faith, that is, in the belief that the trammels placed by him on Mrs. Cruz’ activities were in the best interests of the prison as an institution. The second is that insofar as the technical want of good faith which controls here is *1187 concerned, I am able to say no more for the fact findings below than that they are not clearly erroneous. That I might well, on this record, have found otherwise therefore does not signify.