finding no Bruton 3 Although High Elk makes the same Bruton argument as LaPlante, High Elk has no standing to argue a violation under Bruton. High Elk cannot claim that the testimony deprived him of his confrontation right because he was the declarant of the statements and Mackey did not testify about any statement that LaPlante made implicating High Elk. -5- violation where “each appellant who made an extra-judicial statement was present in court, actually took the witness stand, and subjected himself to cross-examination, both by the government and by the other appellant”
How later courts described this case
- finding no Bruton 3 Although High Elk makes the same Bruton argument as LaPlante, High Elk has no standing to argue a violation under Bruton. High Elk cannot claim that the testimony deprived him of his confrontation right because he was the declarant of the statements and Mackey did not testify about any statement that LaPlante made implicating High Elk. -5- violation where “each appellant who made an extra-judicial statement was present in court, actually took the witness stand, and subjected himself to cross-examination, both by the government and by the other appellant”
- explaining that, in applying 28 1 Jackson test for sufficiency of the evidence, “it is the exclusive function of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, 2 resolve evidentiary conflicts and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts”
- explaining that, in applying Jackson test for sufficiency of the evidence, "it is the exclusive function of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts"
- finding no Bruton violation where “each appellant who made an extra-judicial statement was present in court, actually took the witness stand, and subjected himself to cross-examination, both by the government and by the other appellant”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join in the majority opinion but make one observation. The majority relies on Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 , 97 S.Ct. 1272 , 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), for the proposition that substantial under-representation of a cognizable group in the pool of potential jurors is a constitutional violation and therefore a violation of the Jury Selection and Service Act [Act]. While Castaneda is instructive, it should be remembered that Castaneda is an equal protection attack on *1135 a state grand jury selection system. The Supreme Court has already suggested that the focus of the Act is identical to the constitutional standards surrounding sixth and fifth amendment challenges to jury selection plans. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528-30 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). While the standard in Taylor is expressed in terms of “systematic exclusion”, 419 U.S. at 538 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , Castaneda suggests that substantial under-representation will now suffice.