characterizing the sentence given in that case as “unusually severe,” “excessive,” and “unheard of’
How later courts described this case
- characterizing the sentence given in that case as “unusually severe,” “excessive,” and “unheard of’
- sentence must be vacated and case remanded for resentenc-ing where it appeared that sentence’s length was influenced by defendant’s refusal to testify for government
- remanding because defendant's "refusal to testify may have been an important factor in the sentence"
- “It is one thing to extend leniency to a defendant who is willing to cooperate with the government; it is quite another thing to administer additional punishment to a defendant who by his silence has committed no additional offense.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FEINBERG, Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result):
I agree with Judge Moore that the trial judge should have stated the reasons for his harsh sentence. See, in addition to the authorities cited by Judge Moore, ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences § 2.3(c) (Approved Draft, 1968). Even before the recommendation of the Judicial Council in March 1976, we had emphasized the desirability of a statement of reasons by the sentencing judge, although we had not required it. See United States v. Driscoll, 496 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1973). In addition, we had held that even in the absence of an absolute requirement that reasons ordinarily be stated, particular circumstances might demand it. See McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1972). Accordingly, I concur in the result.