Opinion

In Re John Houtman and Gladys Irene Houtman, Bankrupts. John Houtman and Gladys Irene Houtman v. Edgar F. Mann and Edna M. Mann, Creditors-Appellees

  • 568 F.2d 651
  • 15 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 721
  • 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12918
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jan 25, 1978
Status
Published
Author
Hufstedler
On the bench
Hufstedler, Sneed, Renfrew
Cited by
291 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.1%

Disagreed with by Charlie Kelton's Pontiac, Cadillac, Oldsmobile & Isuzu Truck, Inc. v. Roberts (In Re Roberts), 82 B.R. 179 (1987)

recognizing that “intent to deceive can be inferred from the totality of circumstances, including reckless disregard for the truth”

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing that “intent to deceive can be inferred from the totality of circumstances, including reckless disregard for the truth”
  • holding prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Felsen, supra, that á state court judgment based on fraud establishes only a prima facie case that a debt is nondischargeable in a bankruptcy action
  • construing former section 17(a)(2) and noting “It makes good sense to hold that either actual knowledge of the falsity of a statement, or reckless disregard for its truth, satisfies the scienter requirement for nondischargeability of a debt”
  • “Reckless indifference 'to the actual facts, without examining the available source-of knowledge which lay at hand, and with no reasonable ground to believe that it was in fact correct is sufficient to establish the knowledge element.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Disagreed with by Charlie Kelton's Pontiac, Cadillac, Oldsmobile & Isuzu Truck, Inc. v. Roberts (In Re Roberts), 82 B.R. 179 (1987)

    568 F.2d 651 (9th Cir.1978) ignored the distinction between sufficiency of evidence to support a finding of intent and the intent itself, we respectfully disagree with that decision.
    United States Bankruptcy Court, D. MassachusettsNov 19, 1987Read it

The opinion

HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge,

concurring and dissenting:

I have no quarrel with the majority’s enunciation of the controlling principles of law, but I disagree with the application of those principles in this case. I would remand the case to the district court for reconsideration in the light of the legal principles stated in the majority opinion.

Upon the record, it is impossible to determine whether either the bankruptcy judge or the district court was under the erroneous impression that the state court judgment foreclosed the bankruptcy court and the district court from independently determining dischargeability of the obligation by application of the principles of res judicata *657 (issue preclusion, formerly known as collateral estoppel). The courts below appear to have relied upon the teaching of Coen v. Zick (9th Cir. 1972) 458 F.2d 326 , in which we stated: “[t]he only unresolved inquiry is whether that record [of the state court] taken as true constitutes sufficient proof to establish that the judgment obtained by appellant against the bankrupts in the state court was based upon willful and malicious acts of Coen. We find that it was conclusive of the nature of the proceeding and of the basis upon which the judgment was obtained in the state court.” ( 458 F.2d at 328 .)

As the majority observes, the conclusive effect given by Coen to the state court judgment could not survive the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. We cannot ascertain from the record before us whether the bankruptcy judge would have reached the same dischargeability conclusion if he had been aware that the prior state court judgment did not foreclose the non-dischargeability question and that he was required to make an independent determination whether the judgment represented a “liability for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations” under Section 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, based upon the record of the state court action and upon the testimony before him in the bankruptcy proceedings.

Although I agree that the clearly erroneous standard applies to appellate review of the bankruptcy judge’s findings, that principle is prematurely applied in this case. Although we cannot be sure from the record, the bankruptcy judge appears to have assumed that, under Coen , preclusive effect had to be given to the state court proceedings. Upon that premise, of course, the “findings” are no more than legal conclusions, and those conclusions are erroneous for the reasons stated in the majority opinion.

Accordingly, I would vacate and remand the cause to the district court for reconsideration in the light of the majority opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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