under the Gun Control Act, Congress intended to restrict the disposition of firearms to those with standing felony convictions, even though the convictions might later be found invalid
How later courts described this case
- under the Gun Control Act, Congress intended to restrict the disposition of firearms to those with standing felony convictions, even though the convictions might later be found invalid
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WINTER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority draws a nice distinction as to whether Allen was convicted of a violation of the 1968 Gun Control Act because he was a previously convicted felon, or whether he was convicted because he lied about being a previously convicted felon. The majority concludes that he was convicted of *725 the latter, and since the purpose of the Act was to keep firearms from those who may be “reasonably believed” to have been involved in felonious activity, the reasonable belief may be established by proof of even a void prior conviction.
Even if convicted only because he lied, the proof of Allen’s lie — an essential element of the government’s case — was the record of his allegedly void convictions. His claim is that they were void because he lacked counsel. If true, this was a denial of his sixth amendment right which goes to “the very integrity of the fact-finding process.” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1743 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965).
Along with the courts of appeals decisions cited in the majority opinion n.2, I think that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 , 88 S.Ct. 258 , 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 , 92 S.Ct. 589 , 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); and Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 , 92 S.Ct. 1014 , 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972), prohibit the use of void prior convictions to prove an untruth or to sustain an additional penalty. * Such a use of a possibly void conviction makes the accused suffer “anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right.” Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. at 115 , 88 S.Ct. at 262 . I therefore think it was error for the district court to reject Allen’s sixth amendment objection to the introduction of the prior convictions in the absence of proof that Allen was represented by counsel and without deciding that Allen had not been unconstitutionally denied his right to counsel.
I would reverse and grant a new trial.
See also United States v. Wooten, 503 F.2d 65, 67 (4 Cir. 1974) (dictum); Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116, 121 (4 Cir. 1973) (dictum); Marcum v. United States, 350 F.Supp. 1115 (S.D.W.Va.1972).