stating that “the resolution of [the foreign law issue is one] which we are free to arrive at on the basis of our own independent research and analysis”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “the resolution of [the foreign law issue is one] which we are free to arrive at on the basis of our own independent research and analysis”
- “State law barring an action because of a statute of limitations is sufficiently ‘substantive,’ in the Erie sense, that a federal court in that state exercising diversity jurisdiction must respect it.”
- "reviewing court will not reverse a determination on the part of a federal district court judge of the local law of his state unless there is a firm conviction that it was clearly erroneous”
- applying Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SWYGERT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion the district court correctly analyzed the issues in this case and its judgment should be affirmed.
The lynchpin of the majority’s reasoning is that Article 134(a) constituted a specific limitation on the substantive rights created by Section 1. I cannot agree. The statute of limitations for Section 1 remained Section 20, and Section 20, as the district court held, “is a general statute of limitations, not specifically directed to the plaintiff’s cause of action . . . .” The majority’s analysis might be correct if Section 20 tracked Article 134(a) by stating that the statute of limitations for civil actions was the same as the statute of limitations for criminal actions where the conduct complained of constituted one of the war crimes enumerated in Article 134(a). But Section 20 does not do so. It is applicable to both war crimes and ordinary crimes.
In order to determine what the statute of limitations would be in this case if it were brought in Yugoslavia, it is necessary to look at both Section 20 and Article 134(a). But this fact does not turn Section 20 into a statute specifically directed toward qualifying the substantive rights conferred by Section 1. Section 20 is applicable in Yugoslavia in a broad range of cases that have nothing to do with Section 1 or war crimes. For example, if plaintiff sued defendant in Yugoslavia for damages based on conduct in 1971 which would constitute arson under Yugoslavian law, Section 20 would direct a Yugoslavian court to look to the statute of limitations for the crime of arson. Under the majority’s reasoning, an Illinois court should also use the Yugoslavian statute of limitations for arson because the existence of a specified statute of limitations for that crime sets it apart from other crimes. The majority would consequently have the “specificity” exception swallow the general rule.
Therefore, I cannot say that Section 20 is a specific limitation on Section 1 simply because Article 134(a) focuses on war crimes. Since Section 20 is a general statute of limitations, it is inapplicable in this case.