“[w]e reiterate our adherence to this principle; except as the basis for a prosecution for perjury a witness’s immunized testimony may not be used against him”
How later courts described this case
- “[w]e reiterate our adherence to this principle; except as the basis for a prosecution for perjury a witness’s immunized testimony may not be used against him”
- witness held in civil contempt for refusing to testify; he was incarcerated until he purged the contempt or until the proceedings at which he did not testify were terminated; he took all possible action to get judicial reconsideration of the contempt decision; appellate review deemed appropriate even though the proceedings had terminated and the witness had been released from confinement
- reading Liddy as premised on fact that witness had been granted immunity
- prisoner on parole remains “in (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc). In Frumento, custody” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § we noted that “an appeal is not moot 2254
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROSENN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the majority, with the exception of the dictum that incapability of repetition would not render this appeal moot. See majority op. at 540-541.
As Judge Garth demonstrates, the circumstances giving rise to Pisciotta’s confinement and release are indeed capable of repetition; consequently, this case falls within a well-established exception to general principles of mootness. Therefore, there would appear to be no need for the gratuitous assertion that, even if the circumstances underlying this case were incapable of repetition, the appeal would not be moot because the significance of the interests at stake is itself enough to permit review. Whether the presence of important interests obviates a showing of capability of repetition for purposes of mootness analysis is a troublesome question that should be addressed only in the context of a case squarely presenting that issue.
ADAMS, Circuit Judge, joins in this opinion.