finding that civilian defendant had given his consent to the search of his vehicle when he had entered the military installation subject to his visitor’s pass, which stated on its face: “Acceptance of this pass gives your consent to search this vehicle while entering, aboard, or leaving this station”
How later courts described this case
- finding that civilian defendant had given his consent to the search of his vehicle when he had entered the military installation subject to his visitor’s pass, which stated on its face: “Acceptance of this pass gives your consent to search this vehicle while entering, aboard, or leaving this station”
- holding that the test for improper vouching rests on whether the prosecutor's statements might reasonably have led the jury to believe that the prosecutor possessed extrinsic evidence which convinced the prosecutor of the defendant’s guilt
- holding that consent to search automobile without probable cause was validly obtained where commander of closed military base made it a condition of obtaining a visitor's pass to enter the installation
- stating that "[t]he right to make a search [on a closed military base] pursuant to [] consent does not turn on the presence of probable cause"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RONEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in Judge Clark’s opinion. On the argument that the court erred in refusing to allow a change of plea one day after a court-imposed deadline, I am concerned that we have to rely on, as precedent, United States v. Parkerson, 529 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1976). Parkerson was a Local Rule 21 decision, affirming without opinion, thus holding an opinion to be of no precedential value. 1 At the same time we have been unable to find any case in this Circuit which establishes a precedent on the issue as to the propriety of a court-imposed deadline for accepting a change of plea. It seems to me the point is important enough to require this Court to set forth its premises in an opinion, so that the bench and bar would know the reasoned law of this Circuit.
I agree, however, that Parkerson concludes the matter as far as this panel is concerned, and that any meaningful consideration of the argument could be given only by the Court sitting en banc. Davis v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 1976), and cases there cited. See F.R.A.P. 35.
. Rule 21 provides: “When the court determines that any one or more of the following circumstances exists and is dispositive of a matter submitted to the court for decision: (1) that a judgment of the district court is based on findings of fact which are not clearly erroneous; (2) that the evidence in support of a jury verdict is not insufficient; (3) that the order of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; (4) that no error of law appears; and the court also determines that an opinion would have no precedential value, the judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced without opinion, . . . ” (emphasis supplied),