denying taxpayer standing to challenge payment of federal salaries to White House aides while they allegedly were devoting virtually all their time to the reelection campaign, not their official duties
How later courts described this case
- denying taxpayer standing to challenge payment of federal salaries to White House aides while they allegedly were devoting virtually all their time to the reelection campaign, not their official duties
- plaintiff lacked taxpayer standing to challenge use of White House staff for campaign purposes in violation of Appropriations Clause
- judiciary not to act as a management overseer of the Executive Branch
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McMILLAN, District Judge
(dissenting):
The plaintiffs in this case have, in my opinion, “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness . . . upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions,” and have therefore alleged the “gist of the question of standing,” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1967). In addition, one plaintiff at least is noted for his tenacity and perspicacity in the pursuit of public interest cases. A live “case or controversy” exists.
This case is unlike Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 , 94 S.Ct. 2925 , 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974), because it attacks directly a misuse of funds by executive officers rather than executive action like that challenged in Schlesinger v. Reservists, supra, which did not directly call for spending public funds but merely continued in effect a military reserve status for legislators.
This case is unlike United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 , 94 S.Ct. 2940 , 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974), because Richardson did not attack executive spending at all, but sought to require the Executive to make more meaningful reports on CIA operations.
This case is unlike both Reservists and Richardson because it alleges that defendants’ use of tax money for political purposes runs counter to concrete prohibitions in both the Constitution and in an Act of Congress.
“Standing” requirements have already done much to close the door of the federal court house to citizen complaints about government operations; and I would not add any unnecessary impetus to that closing, unless existing controlling authority absolutely requires such a result. Though Richardson and Reservists might inferentially support a denial of standing, they do not in my opinion require such a result. I would not dismiss for lack of standing, but would uphold standing based upon the considerations set out above, and on those expressed in Mr. Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Reservists, 418 U.S. 208, 355 , 94 S.Ct. 2925 , 41 L.Ed.2d 706 .
It is true that many federal employees are exempt from the Hatch Act, and that some of the defendants may come under the exemption covering employees whose salaries are paid out of the “appropriation for the office of the President” under 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (d). That, of course, is a factual issue for the trial court.
In summary, I would find that plaintiffs have standing to bring the suit and that the case should be decided on the merits in favor of those defendants who may be covered by the express exemptions under 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (d), but against any defendants not expressly so covered, including any persons whose salaries come from sources other than “appropriations for the office of the President.”