recognizing a § 43(a) claim against ABC for broadcasting a heavily edited version of a copyrighted Monty Python piece without the group’s permission, and holding that it is “sufficient to violate the Act that the representation of a product, although technically true, creates a false impression of the product’s origin.” (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- recognizing a § 43(a) claim against ABC for broadcasting a heavily edited version of a copyrighted Monty Python piece without the group’s permission, and holding that it is “sufficient to violate the Act that the representation of a product, although technically true, creates a false impression of the product’s origin.” (citation omitted)
- stating in dicta that broadcasting heavily edited version of “Monty Python’s Flying Circus” without appropriate disclaimer that authors had not approved editing amounted to violation of section 43(a)
- noting that “[o]ne who obtains permission to use a copyrighted” work “may not exceed the specific purpose for which permission was granted” and concluding that “unauthorized editing of the underlying work, if proven, would constitute an infringement of the copyright in that work similar to any other use of a work that exceeded the license granted by the proprietor of the copyright” (emphasis added)
- stating that provision in license retaining rights in pre- existing script “suggest[s] that the parties did not consider themselves joint authors of a single work”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GURFEIN, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in my brother Lumbard’s scholarly opinion, but I wish to comment on the application of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a).
I believe that this is the first case in which a federal appellate court has held that there may be a violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act with respect to a common-law copyright. The Lanham Act is a trademark statute, not a copyright statute. . Nevertheless, we must recognize that the language of Section 43(a) is broad. It speaks of the affixation or use of false designations of origin or false descriptions or representations, but proscribes such use “in connection with any goods or services.” It is easy enough to incorporate trade names as well as trademarks into Section 43(a) and the statute specifically applies to common law trademarks, as well as registered. trademarks. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 .
In the present case, we are holding that the deletion of portions of the recorded tape constitutes a breach of contract, as well as an infringement of a common-law copyright of the original work. There is literally no need to discuss whether plaintiffs also have a claim for relief under the Lanham Act or for unfair competition under New York law. I agree with Judge Lumbard, however, that it may be an exercise of judicial economy to express our view on the Lanham Act claim, and I do not dissent therefrom. I simply wish to leave it open for the District Court to fashion the remedy.
The Copyright Act provides no recognition of the so-called droit moral, or moral right of authors. Nor are such rights recognized in the field of copyright law in the United States. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright, § 110.2 (1975 ed.). If a distortion or truncation in connection with a use constitutes an infringement of copyright, there is no need for an additional cause of action beyond copyright infringement. Id. at § 110.3. An obligation to mention the name of the author carries the implied duty, however, as a matter of contract, not to make such changes in the work as would render the credit line a false attribution of authorship, Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2 Cir. 1952).
*27 So far as the Lanham Act is concerned, it is not a substitute for droit moral which authors in Europe enjoy. If the licensee may, by contract, distort the recorded work, the Lanham Act does not come into play. If the licensee has no such right by contract, there will be a violation in breach of contract. The Lanham Act can hardly apply literally when the credit line correctly states the work to be that of the plaintiffs which, indeed it is, so far as it goes. The vice complained of is that the truncated version is not what the plaintiffs wrote. But the Lanham Act does not deal with artistic integrity. It only goes to misdescription of origin and the like. See Societe Comptoir De L’Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander’s Dept. Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 , 36 (2 Cir. 1962).
The misdescription of origin can be dealt with, as Judge Lasker did below, by devising an appropriate legend to indicate that the plaintiffs had not approved the editing of the ABC version. 1 With such a legend, there is no conceivable violation of the Lanham Act. If plaintiffs complain that their artistic integrity is still compromised by the distorted version, their claim does not lie under the Lanham Act, which does not protect the copyrighted work itself but protects only against the misdescription or mislabelling.
So long as it is made clear that the ABC version is not approved by the Monty Python group, there is no misdescription of origin. So far as the content of the broadcast itself is concerned, that is not within the proscription of the Lanham Act when there is no misdescription of the authorship.
I add this brief explanation because I do not believe that the Lanham Act claim necessarily requires the drastic remedy of permanent injunction. That form of ultimate relief must be found in some other fountainhead of equity jurisprudence.
. I do not imply that the appropriate legend be shown only at the beginning of the broadcast. That is a matter for the District Court.