holding that a sufficient indictment "is of paramount importance" and "required . . . to avoid [a] conviction on facts not found, or perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury that indicted [the defendant]"
How later courts described this case
- holding that a sufficient indictment "is of paramount importance" and "required . . . to avoid [a] conviction on facts not found, or perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury that indicted [the defendant]"
- rejecting argument that the defendant should have been prosecuted under specific statute criminalizing the making of false statements in connection with medicare claims rather than § 1001 because there was no evidence of an intent to make the specific statute a substitute for any part of § 1001
- overturning convictions for making false statements when an immaterial alleged misstatement was submitted to jury and could have been basis of general verdict
- upholding convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for false statement in Medicare claims despite more specific later-enacted prohibitions in 42 U.S.C. § 408
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by United States v. Sammy G. Daily and Frederik A. Figge, 921 F.2d 994 (1991)
Apao, 59 Haw. at 635 & n. 5, 586 P.2d 250, 257 & n. 5 (quoting United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 562 (10th Cir.1976), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994, 1004 & n. 11 (10th Cir.1990)).
The opinion
LEWIS, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent from Part II of my Brother Holloway’s opinion relating to the submission of the bill of particulars to the jury and my Brother Barrett’s views on that aspect of the case.
This ease is by its very nature one of complexity but with careful preparation and presentation that complexity need not have resulted in complete confusion. I am fearful that defendant was convicted on grounds other than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And, to me, we seem to be perpetuating that confusion.
Recognizing that a bill of particulars is a self-serving prosecutorial document and neither part of the indictment nor evidence, the main opinion states that the prosecution gained an advantage by submitting the document to the jury but the defendant was not prejudiced by such untraditional procedure. But the trial judge termed submission of the bill of particulars as “almost a necessity if the jury is to return an intelligent verdict.” In turn, the prosecutor indicated that without submission of the bill of particulars the jury “may well convict on one of the items listed on the request for payment which hasn’t even been challenged by the United States.”
In sum, I dissent because I believe that a bill of particulars is inherently a self-serving document created by the prosecution which should never be submitted to the jury absent a formal rule and that in this case the prejudice to defendant is glaringly apparent. I would grant a new trial on each count.