explaining a "suit seeking habeas corpus relief” "cannot be utilized as a base for the review of a refusal to grant collateral administrative relief or as a springboard to adjudicate matters foreign to the question of the legality of custody”
How later courts described this case
- explaining a "suit seeking habeas corpus relief” "cannot be utilized as a base for the review of a refusal to grant collateral administrative relief or as a springboard to adjudicate matters foreign to the question of the legality of custody”
- explaining that the purpose of habeas corpus is to grant relief from unlawful custody or imprisonment— and that it cannot be used for any other purpose
- “Simply stated, habeas is not available to review questions unrelated to the cause of detention. Its sole function is to grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody[,] and it cannot be used properly for any other purpose.”
- statute providing for exclusion of certain aliens seeking to work in this country cannot apply to refugees because it would “render the Convention meaningless as a practical matter”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge
(specifically concurring:)
I am in full agreement with Judge Dyer’s excellent opinion in this case. I wish to emphasize, however, a point not expressly stated therein. As I read the Court’s opinion, its holding that habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for the relief these petitioners seek does not foreclose the possibility of an independent action for declaratory or injunctive relief. Jurisdiction in such an action might lie under either 8 U.S.C. § 1329 or 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . 1 The majority holds *937 only that habeas has its boundaries; the writ does not permit us to roam the judicial range in a farfetched effort to grant declaratory or injunctive relief unrelated to the question of custody.
Nevertheless, although no custody or threat of custody can be read into the District Director’s denial of employment authorization, 2 his action may well amount to a denial of rights guaranteed by a treaty or statute — an injury which a court of equity could redress. I add this concurring opinion simply to stress that the decision today does not preclude an independent action, properly plead and presented to the district court for adjudication.
. Petitioners’ utter failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in their application for preliminary injunction forces me to agree that the only possible jurisdictional basis in the case before us is under habeas corpus. The appli *937 cation itself is silent on the question of jurisdiction. It reads as follows in its entirety:
COME NOW the Petitioners, MARIE PIERRE, ET AL., and move this Honorable Court to grant a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based upon the attached affidavit of IRA GOLLIBIN, ESQUIRE, the Exhibits thereto, and the Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Temporary Restraining Order.
Nowhere in this short paragraph is there a statement of the grounds of jurisdiction, as required by Rule 8(a)(1). The affidavit simply sets out the factual basis for the application. The Exhibits and Memorandum do not appear in the record before us; therefore, we cannot rely on them to support independent jurisdiction. Furthermore, even if they were in the record, I seriously doubt whether a Memorandum of Law can be incorporated by reference in a pleading to correct pleading deficiencies.
. Although petitioners fear that the practical result of the Director’s denial will mean abandonment of the main action, their apprehension does not convert the case into one involving custody.