holding that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3) protects the right to vote in tribal elections against interference from private conspiracies and that political dissidents constituted a class for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3)
How later courts described this case
- holding that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3) protects the right to vote in tribal elections against interference from private conspiracies and that political dissidents constituted a class for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3)
- holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) protects the right to vote in tribal elections against interference from private conspiracies and that political dissidents constituted a class for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
- holding tribal members stated a claim against the tribal election board for interference with their right to vote in tribal elections under § 1302(8) based on allegations of procedural misconduct aimed at ensuring the election of the incumbent council president
- applying traditional constitutional prin ciples to practice that “ is not founded [on a] tribal custom or governmental pur pose which would justify modification of traditional equal protection concepts”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347 (1985)
Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d at 840, is distinguishable because in that case "the only possible adequate allegation of a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3)" involved the tribal council president who was alleged to have conspired with other private individuals.
The opinion
WEBSTER, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in Parts I and III of the opinion, but I respectfully dissent from the holding in Part II.
I cannot agree that supporters of a particular candidate form a sufficiently discrete class upon which to predicate federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3). Race is not involved in this contest; Indian supporters of one group of political candidates bring this action against Indian supporters of another. The holding in Part II of the majority opinion permits a non-insular, mutable, amorphous group to satisfy the alternative requirement in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 , 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798 , 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), that “there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” (Emphasis added.)
Taken to its logical extension this holding grants federal jurisdiction to any group of supporters of a local candidate who claim they were purposefully victimized by their opponents in state or local elections. Thus is introduced into our system a “general federal tort law” feared by Justice Stewart, author of Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 , 91 S.Ct. 1790 .
Acceptance of my view on this point would not leave the plaintiffs without a remedy. See Point III of the majority opinion.