observing that “probationers, like parolees and prisoners, properly are subject to limitations from which ordinary persons are free” and that “[mjerely because a convicted individual’s fundamental rights are involved should not * make a probation condition ... automatically suspect”
How later courts described this case
- observing that “probationers, like parolees and prisoners, properly are subject to limitations from which ordinary persons are free” and that “[mjerely because a convicted individual’s fundamental rights are involved should not * make a probation condition ... automatically suspect”
- holding that a “probationer, like the parolee, has the right to enjoy a significant degree of privacy,” which is infringed when a parole search is “intimidating and harassing”
- recommending the following probation condition in order to provide unambiguous guidance to both the probationer and the probation officer in conducting searches: “[tjhat she submit to search of her person or property conducted in a reasonable manner at a reasonable time”
- rejecting an argument that the “contract theory” of parole could be applied to probationers so as to make “[s]ubmission to [to any search] the price of probation”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHOY, Circuit Judge:
I concur in the majority opinion except as to the statement at page 266 reiterating the approbation given in the majority opinion in Latta v. Fitzharris to mere hunch as a basis of reasonable belief for a warrantless search by a parole/probation officer of a parolee’s/probationer’s residence.
For the reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Latta, I think the statement is ill-advised.
Circuit Judge MERRILL concurs in this concurring opinion.