finding that the chief executive officer of a corporation was subject to in personam jurisdiction based on the corporation's activities in the forum state when the evidence indicated that the corporation was merely the alter ego of the chief executive officer
How later courts described this case
- finding that the chief executive officer of a corporation was subject to in personam jurisdiction based on the corporation's activities in the forum state when the evidence indicated that the corporation was merely the alter ego of the chief executive officer
- stating that “[a] court may find personal jurisdiction over a defendant through piercing the corporate veil”
- refusing to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident parent corporation unless the corporate separateness of parent and subsidiary has been ignored to the point that corporate law would disregard the parent-subsidiary relationship
- explaining that “if the corporation is [the defendant’s] alter ego, its contacts are [the defendant’s] and due process is satisfied”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The claim for lost profits in a case of this kind rests upon pure speculation alone. The trial court should not, for at least two reasons, have submitted this issue to the jury.
First, the expert testimony in the instant case was conjectural and speculative. Two experts, whose qualifications to offer an opinion on the matter were, at best, dubious, testified as to lost profits. Ed Breen, the general chairman of the Girl Scouts’ campaign, testified that, based upon his experience in United Fund campaigns and a Y.M.C.A. drive and upon his belief that the community generally supported the Girl Scouts, the goal of $345,000 was attainable. He grounded his opinion that widespread public support existed for the drive principally upon his view that the families of Girl Scouts would contribute and that “supporting the Girl Scouts * * * [is] like supporting motherhood.” The record shows that local sponsors of the fund campaign were less than generous in their contributions, however, and that Breen admitted to no prior experience with drives in support of Girl Scouts.
Moreover, the deposition of James D. Harrison, which was read to the jury, discloses that Harrison, as the only other expert witness on the question of damages, had never participated in any fund-raising drives in the Fort Dodge area and had never participated in such drives for the Girl Scouts anywhere. His opinion as to what might have been raised in this community was extrapolated from his experience in communities in Illinois and Washington.
In short, the conclusion of both Breen and Harrison that the Lakota Girl Scout Council campaign could gross $345,000 if properly managed reflected a hoped-for result and rested entirely upon speculation about the receptiveness of the Fort Dodge community to such a campaign. No such campaign had been undertaken in the community previously, and it was consequently, impossible for any witness, including Breen or Harrison, to testify with any degree of accuracy to its likelihood of success.
Second, Iowa adheres to the “new business rule,” which precludes recovery of lost profits by an enterprise that has no operating history from which profits may be accurately projected. See City of Corning v. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 225 Iowa 1380 , 282 N.W. 791, 796 (1938) (dictum); Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Benton County Creamery Co., 120 Iowa 584 , 95 N.W. 188, 189 (1903). There is no justification for importing authority from other jurisdictions in support of the position that the Iowa courts, if this diversity case had been brought before them, would waive the “new business rule” on these facts. The opposite is more likely true, for, in contradistinction to Wachtel v. National Alfalfa Journal Co., 190 Iowa 1293 , 176 N.W. 801 (1920), a case, cited by the majority, in which the Iowa Supreme Court allowed recovery of prize money where the amount of the prize was fixed in advance of the plaintiff’s participation in the contest and the plaintiff’s entitlement to the prize was established to a virtual certainty, the very existence of damages in the form of lost profits is, in the instant case, highly questionable. Where “it is speculative and uncertain whether damages have been sustained, recovery * * * [should be] denied.” DeWaay v. Muhr, 160 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Iowa 1968).
The amount of the jury award demonstrates the speculative nature of the damages. Although the award does not, in light of the damages actually proved but not submitted to the jury, appear wholly unreasonable, 8 it cannot be reconciled with the testimony relied upon to *645 support the judgment, for, if that testimony had been believed or given credence, the award would have been at least $96,000 — the difference between the campaign goal of $345,000 and $160,-000 pledged plus $89,000 realized.
I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial on the issue of damages.
. The Lakota Girl Scout Council justifiably could claim as damages all or part of $24,000 paid to the promoter-appellant for his services and all or part of $10,000 for extra office expense incurred in connection with the fund drive.