court affirms jury verdict in favor of seaman despite fact that he signed release, entered into one year after accident, since release was the product of mutual mistake of fact regarding his medical condition
How later courts described this case
- court affirms jury verdict in favor of seaman despite fact that he signed release, entered into one year after accident, since release was the product of mutual mistake of fact regarding his medical condition
- court affirms jury’s disregard of release, noting that all parties were operating under a mistaken diagnosis of present injury
- “A mistake with regard to diagnosis has long been recognized as cause for setting aside a seaman’s release.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RIVES, Circuit Judge
(concurring specially):
As to the reversal of the $12,000.00 inflation compensation award, I am, of course, bound by this Court’s recent en banc decision in Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 5 Cir. 1975, 510 F.2d 234 , and in Starnes v. Penrod Drilling Co., 5 Cir. 1975, 510 F.2d 234 .
As to the affirmance of the basic award of $138,000.00, I rely upon the rationale suggested by the Supreme Court in Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Corp., 1959, 361 U.S. 107 at 109, 110 , 80 S.Ct. 173 , 4 L.Ed.2d 142 even though Sentilles was a Jones Act case. I adhere to the view expressed in my dissenting opinion in Boeing Company v. Shipman, 5 Cir. 1969, 411 F.2d 365 , and therefore think that the standard for judging the sufficiency of the evidence to require submission of a case to a jury in F.E. L.A. cases, Jones Act cases, and all other jury cases is the same constitutional standard. I think that the evidence in this case as recited in the majority opinion met the constitutional standard. I therefore specially concur.