held, Indian plaintiffs entitled to a due process hearing. Bureau of Indian Affairs was estopped from denying that the work program was “general assistance” for termination purposes
How later courts described this case
- held, Indian plaintiffs entitled to a due process hearing. Bureau of Indian Affairs was estopped from denying that the work program was “general assistance” for termination purposes
- due process hearing required before termination of Snyder Act program
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WILLIAM P. GRAY, District Judge
(dissenting):
Although it may very well be that the Indians here concerned were shabbily treated, I am unable to agree that the particular relief sought, and now granted by the majority, is appropriate. The appellants were terminated from their employment under the TWEP project, not because of an administrative determination that they were ineligible, but because the funds allocated to the project had become exhausted. No one contends that the appellants had a constitutional right that the project be continued; so there is no occasion for a hearing in order that the reasons for the termination might be argued.
Judge Battin, in his “Memorandum Opinion And Order,” from which this appeal is taken, found that “the ending of TWEP in April did not effectively terminate the plaintiffs’ receipt of ordinary general assistance, for all they had to do to continue to receive checks in substantially the same amounts was to indicate their desire to do so.” There clearly was evidence to support such a finding; thus, there is no occasion for a hearing to establish the eligibility of the petitioners to continue as beneficiaries under the general relief program.
There is some indication that, due to lack of communication or through administrative inefficiency, some of the Indians affected by the termination of the TWEP program were not promptly picked up on the relief rolls. But such unfortunate occurrences hardly form the basis for a Goldberg mandated hearing.
I would affirm Judge Battin’s dismissal of the action for the reasons stated in his Memorandum Opinion.