Opinion

Nor-Cal Adjusters, AKA Nor-Cal Insurance Adjusters, Formerly Hobson Adjusters, a Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

  • 503 F.2d 359
  • 34 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5834
  • 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6994
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Sep 5, 1974
Status
Published
Author
Trask
On the bench
Thompson, Trask
Cited by
117 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.0%

holding that “the Tax Court’s ruling [denying a motion to reopen the record] is not subject to review except upon a demonstration of extraordinary circumstances which reveal a clear abuse of discretion”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that “the Tax Court’s ruling [denying a motion to reopen the record] is not subject to review except upon a demonstration of extraordinary circumstances which reveal a clear abuse of discretion”
  • holding that an unstructured system of setting shareholder compensation, with no preset criteria, indicated that the shareholder compensation was actually disguised distributions
  • holding that taxpayer’s payments of compensation to shareholders in lump sums rather than as services were performed was an indication that payments were disguised distributions
  • holding that the fact that the taxpayer consistently had negligible taxable income was an indication that compensation paid to shareholders was disguised distributions

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

TRASK, Circuit Judge

(dissenting):

As the majority correctly points out Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 162(a) (l) 1 requires that for compensation paid by a corporation to its officers to be deductible as expenses, the compensation must (1) be reasonable in amount and, (2) must be for personal services actually rendered.

Here the notice of deficiency told the taxpayer that:

“ . . . compensation paid your officers during the taxable year 1967 is excessive in the amount of $13,000.00. Such amount exceeds a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered . . . .” (C.T. at 7.)

Reading that notice, the thrust of the charge of deficiency is clearly based upon the theory of excessiveness of sums paid. There is no suggestion that would notify a reasonable person that the real ground of the Commissioner’s attack would be based upon a theory that the monies paid constituted a distribution of dividends and not an excessive amount paid for services rendered.

The Commissioner could have relied upon a quantitative impropriety, i. e., that the amounts paid for the services rendered were excessive. He could alternatively have relied upon a qualitative impropriety, i. e., that the amounts paid were not for services rendered at all but were in the nature of a distribution of earnings and profits. When the notice of deficiency to the taxpayer was in terms of excessiveness and the decision was predicated upon distribution of dividends, the taxpayer did not simply receive inadequate notice. He has actually been deceived. Baird v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 490, 493 (3d Cir. 1971). The Government points out that its counsel at the outset of the hearing announced that “ . . . the government’s position is based mainly on the fact that we will contend these distributions were, in effect, a distribution of earnings and profits.” (C.T. at 7) (Emphasis supplied). In view of the language of the deficiency notice this introduced an element of gamey uncertainty into the Government’s theory but still did not disavow or alter the formal issue tendered. 2

I would require the Commissioner to adhere to the grounds announced to the *364 taxpayer in its deficiency notice. To compound the problem, the Tax Court declined to permit the taxpayer an opportunity to reopen and submit relevant evidence to rebut the untendered issue upon which the Government tried its case. I would reverse and remand.

. “162. Trade or business expenses

“(a) . . . There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including—

“(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered; . . . ”

. On this issue the court stated :

“Petitioner has introduced persuasive evidence that the total compensation paid to its officers was reasonable in amount. Even the internal revenue agent who audited petitioner’s income tax returns evinced his belief that the total amounts were not unreasonable.” (C.T. at 31.)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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