holding that, in extreme circumstances, a district court should divest itself of jurisdiction over a criminal case if the defendant's presence was secured by the government's "deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights"
How later courts described this case
- holding that, in extreme circumstances, a district court should divest itself of jurisdiction over a criminal case if the defendant's presence was secured by the government's "deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights"
- finding that state-sponsored kidnapping as alleged violated the territorial integrity of the sovereign and thereby violated provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of American States
- reversing a lower court ruling that allegations of government kidnaping and torture of a defendant would not require dismissal of the case if proved, and distinguishing prior inconsistent cases on the grounds that they did not involve “violation of international treaties” even though the two treaties in question, the United Nations Charter and the Organization of American States charter, were non-self-executing
- remanding to district court to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to defendant's allegations of forcible abduction at hands of foreign officials allegedly at the behest of United States officials if defendant is able to "offer[] some credible supporting evidence ... that the action was taken by or at the direction of United States officials"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled — as noted by 2 later courts
See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing that its previous holding articulated in United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), "that aliens may invoke the Fourth Amendment against searches conducted abroad by the U.S. government" was "no longer valid in light of Verdugo-Urquidez").
2 citing opinionsin partAbrogated in part, on other grounds by United States v. Odeh, 552 F.3d 157 (2008)
" United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008).
Questioned by In re the Extradition of Singh, 123 F.R.D. 140 (1988)
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to conclude that Toscanino is inapplicable as a matter of law:
Limited by State v. Barnhouse, 111 Idaho 673 (1986)
500 F.2d at 275. Toscanino was soon strictly limited to its facts — characterized by the Second Circuit as “shocking, cruel, inhuman and outrageous” conduct on the part of the government.
The opinion
ROBERT P. ANDERSON,
Circuit Judge (concurring in result):
I concur in the result.
My .concurrence is so limited because this case can be disposed of on" due process grounds alone. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). The majority opinion well establishes that if the defendant is successful in proving what he has alleged about the highly irregular activities of the Federal agents, this court is not going to sanction or validate them by affirming the conviction of the defendant. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2 Cir. 1973). The courts of this country, in dealing with cases before them, no longer completely disregard the behavior of our police agents when they are operating outside of the national boundaries.
To reach this conclusion, however, this court need not hold that the Bill of Rights has extraterritorial application for foreign nationals. Defendant could show that he was carried into this jurisdiction in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the Government need not comply with the Fourth Amendment or the United States wire tap laws in foreign jurisdictions. To hold otherwise would be novel and would make unreasonable demands on our foreign agents, whether in law enforcement or national security, who by following the law of the country in which they are staying, could at the same time find themselves in defiance of United States constitutional safeguards.
Further, defendant did not enter this country pursuant to any treaty; he is, therefore, not “clothed” in any treaty rights and cannot invoke the extradition treaty or the charters of the Organization of American States and the United Nations as personal defenses, United States v. Sobell, 142 F.Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y.1956) (Kaufman, Judge), aff’d 244 *282 F.2d 520 (2 Cir.), cert. den. 355 U.S. 873 , 78 S.Ct. 120 , 2 L.Ed.2d 77 (1957). Violation of the standards laid down by these treaties is again indicative of the denial of due process, but not a defense in and of itself. By and large treaties are to be enforced by governments, rather than by their individual citizens, and neither the United States, Uruguay nor Brazil contemplated that, under these circumstances, a defendant could personally seek to invoke these treaties.