holding 20 that “in terms of loss of . . . tax dollars and in terms of identity of interest with the asserted rights of the pupils and their parents” school board had standing
How later courts described this case
- holding 20 that “in terms of loss of . . . tax dollars and in terms of identity of interest with the asserted rights of the pupils and their parents” school board had standing
- granting a school board standing to challenge state districting and transfer policies which increased segregation within school board’s district on any of three theories: (1) jus tertii representation of parents and students; (2
- “But in our instant case, not only are children transferred, but tax dollars otherwise due the Akron School Board are transferred too.”
- a board of education and school superintendent had standing based on “a close relationship between the plaintiffs who seek to bring an action and the class of persons whose constitutional rights are *643 claimed to be violated”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PRATT, District Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Agreeing as I do with Judge Edwards that the plaintiffs herein have standing to sue, I concur in the remand of this ease to the District Court so that the plaintiffs herein may have an opportunity to amend. (See 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.09).
I also agree with Judge Weick that the Akron Board of Education is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). However, a remand would permit plaintiffs, if they choose, to add parties plaintiff to overcome this obstacle.
Further, plaintiffs should be permitted to amend to allege jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . It appears from the last paragraph of plaintiffs’ Brief that plaintiffs considered they were precluded from asserting that jurisdictional basis in view of the finding of the District *1293 Court that plaintiffs lacked standing. 1 The standing issue being otherwise decided here, plaintiffs can now pursue that avenue.
. “Finally, even if 28 U.S.C. Section 1343 were to be read so narrowly as to prevent the plaintiffs from bringing their action without the requirement of a jurisdictional amount, the provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 would permit them to maintain the aetion. Although this additional jurisdictional basis could have been asserted as was the case in Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956), the court below should have permitted an amendment for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction thereunder if necessary. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 , 66 S.Ct. 773 , 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) ; Sikora v. Brenner, [ 126 U.S.App.D.C. 357 , 379 F.2d 134 ] supra. That it did not do so is clearly attributable to its belief that in any event the plaintiffs lacked standing.” (App. brief pp. 19-20).