rejecting the defendant’s reliance on 18 U.S.C.A. § 2517(4) because the court found a crime-fraud exception to the federal marital communications privilege
How later courts described this case
- rejecting the defendant’s reliance on 18 U.S.C.A. § 2517(4) because the court found a crime-fraud exception to the federal marital communications privilege
- cross-petition raising marital privilege issue
- involving the confidential communication privilege
- marital privilege does not protect conversations between husband and wife concerning commission of a crime and not the privacy of their marriage
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Arturo Reyes Mendoza, June Bunch Mendoza, and Oscar Reyes Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373 (1978)
Second, as the Seventh Circuit observed in United States v. Kahn, supra, 471 F.2d at 195, Ivey is distinguishable because “the objectionable testimony of Mrs. Ivey did not deal with the furtherance of a crime, but with an admission of a past crime.
The opinion
KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I am in complete accord with Judge Kiley’s well reasoned views concerning the interception of Minnie Kahn’s telephone conversations with others than Irving Kahn, but I must respectfully dissent from his conclusion that the marital privilege does not apply to their conversations with each other. As counsel for the Kahns argued persuasively before this Court, an attorney-client relationship may be effectively destroyed once the two become fellow criminals, but husband and wife remain husband and wife even though they embark on a joint criminal venture. I would affirm the decision of the District Judge.