concluding that the defendant’s “own memory was understandably vague with regard to events occurring eight and one-half years before trial”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the defendant’s “own memory was understandably vague with regard to events occurring eight and one-half years before trial”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WEICK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In my opinion the speedy trial safeguard of the Sixth Amendment applies only to delay occurring after the defendant has been charged with the commission of an offense. In the present case only a warrant for his arrest had been issued in Tennessee. He had not been arrested; rather, only a detainer was filed with authorities in Illinois. It is questionable here whether a demand for trial was ever made to the proper authority. See Short v. Cardwell, 444 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1971).
Delay in filing an indictment is governed by the applicable statute of limitations. This has been the established law of the Sixth Circuit for many years. Lothridge v. United States, 441 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Harris, 412 F.2d 471 (6th Cir. 1969) ; Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1959); Parker v. United States, 252 F.2d 680 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 964 , 78 S.Ct. 1003 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1958). Accord: Reece v. United States, 337 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1964); Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 , 83 S.Ct. 25 , 9 L.Ed.2d 56 (1962); Foley v. United States, 290 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1961); D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 , 72 S.Ct. 772 , 96 L.Ed. 1343 (1952). See also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (Decided December 20, 1971).
I would affirm for the reasons stated by Chief Judge Bailey Brown in his Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Petition and Dismissing Action, 334 F.Supp. 1316 .