permitting admission of a letter into evidence during an antitrust case even though the letter was the subject of litigation in a previously settled libel suit
How later courts described this case
- permitting admission of a letter into evidence during an antitrust case even though the letter was the subject of litigation in a previously settled libel suit
- “I think it would be impossible for me to determine any individual sale, whether it had been delayed, killed or — by that event [Smart’s breach].”
- expert testimony regarding market penetration relied on the “totally unsubstantiated assumption that the [defendant] would not take competitive steps” to protect its position
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COLEMAN, Circuit Judge,
with whom GOLDBERG and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that portion of the opinion of the Court which affirms the judgment below as to the liability of the appellant.
As to the remand for a new trial on the issue of damages, I respectfully dissent. The reasons were originally set forth in my dissent to the panel decision, 417 F.2d 61, 62 , as follows:
“Together with its claim that the verdict was without foundation, the Bureau contends that the verdict of $375,000 was excessive. I disagree. In a ease such as this, it is impossible to determine damages with absolute certainty. As we have said, 'Once the fact of injury is established, the jury has considerable leeway in assessing the amount of damages’, Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Services, Inc., 5 Cir., 1967, 383 F.2d 97, 103, 106 .
“Both Terrell and an accountant testified that he spent in excess of $150,-000 to compute and publish the guide. Terrell also testified that he knew he would lose money on the Oil Field Haulers Association contract, but could gain it back when he got a foothold in the market. He anticipated sales of 22,500 copies and publication every two years. This number, based on the amount purchased by the Bureau, was not clearly unreasonable. Colonel Branigan of D.T.M.S. expressed the opinion that if the Terrell guide were accepted by D.T.M.S., other carriers would change over to it. Mr. Wyche himself stated that if another guide existed which lowered charges, the Bureau would he forced to file an identical guide.
“Of course, Terrell never received these benefits and the profits he anticipated were never realized. But had Terrell been permitted to compete and sell his 22,500 guides at $15 per copy, his gross profit would have been $337,-500. In addition, Terrell had an agreement to publish a second national guide for the Oil Field Haulers Association for $20,000 and a tentative agreement to publish a four and eight state guide for $54,000. Because of the defendant’s activities these agreements were never carried out.
“On the basis of these facts, the verdict of $375,000 was not so clearly excessive as to justify appellate interference.
“In view of the foregoing, I would unhesitatingly affirm the judgment of the District Court as to Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau. From our failure to do so I respectfully dissent.”